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Atomic progress in the United States has evolved under three
types of government control. The first, lasting from 1942-1946, was
imposed by the military and continued the control by secrecy which had
been initiated by scientists after their recognition of fission in early
1939. The objective of this control was production of the atomic
bomb. In 1946 the first United States Atomic Energy Act' was
adopted, transferring control of atomic matters to a civilian agency
but still retaining a tight government monopoly over most atomic
endeavors. The accent under this act was the stockpiling of nuclear
materials and weapons, but some studies of nuclear power were made,
and in the last days of the act a governmental program of power reactor
experimentation was inaugurated. The current act is the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954.2 This act was intended to enable private industry
to participate in peaceful employment of the atom; in fact, industry
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guidance given during the preparation of this survey. Any good points made herein
probably were inserted at his recommendation; the bad points probably were retained
over his objection.
' Member, California and Los Angeles Bars. Formerly AEC Research Chemist,
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1. 60 STAT. 755 (1946), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1801-19 (1952).
2. 68 STAT. 919 (1954), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-281 (Supp. 111,1955), as
amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §§2017(a), (b), 2078(a), (b) (Supp. 1956).
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was encouraged to enter as much of the field as it desired. Regulation
of industry is part of the function of the Atomic Energy Commission,
the five-member civilian agency administering the statute. This com-
mission functions under the close scrutiny of the eighteen-member
congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.
Unlike most legislation, the act was drafted to cover private
activities and arrangements which had no precedent in practice, facing
problems which could only be speculated about. The field still remains
one in which predictions become obsolete before they can be put into
print. Virtually no amendment has been made to the act, nor does the
Commission currently recommend any, although regulations supple-
menting it continue to be promulgated, thereby aiding adjustment of
the law to changing circumstances.
It is believed that it would be interesting and informative at this
time, two years after passage of the act, to see how it has been applied,
to see what problems have arisen through this application, and to
conjecture as to the course future amendments might take. In the
ensuing discussion, the intention has been to honor the philosophy
followed by Robert McKinney in organizing his panel report-what
nobody needs is a long scholarly post mortem of the atomic field.4
THE BASIS OF GOVERNMENT CONTROL
A critical survey of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 might begin
by asking why there is any need for a law on this subject at all. Why
should not the Government be expected to limit its concern with atomic
energy to the military aspects, leaving domestic peaceful atomic de-
velopment to industry, in accordance with the tradition of private
enterprise? One of the primary explanations is an historical one-control
once imposed is hard to abandon. Atomic fission was discovered in
a wartime atmosphere when regulation was accepted naturally and, in
large part, unknowingly, since even Congress was mostly uninformed
and unaware as to what was in progress. Following the war, it took
a bitter struggle to pry the atom out of military control. Even the
Atomic Energy Act of 1946 was drafted to cover a program that was
primarily -concerned with building an atomic arsenal. As nuclear
research advanced in other countries and as nuclear materials became
more widely available, the justification for strict government control
3. Hearings Before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 13
(1956).
4. McKinney, Work of the Panel on the Impact of Peaceful Uses of Atomic
Energy, CoMMCcIAL AND INTERNATIONAL DEVMLOPMZXNTS IN ATomic EN4RGY 355, 357
(Atomic Industrial Forum Report No. 7, 1956).
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became progressively less. Considerable relaxation was embodied in
the present act, the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, and private industry
got its first real chance at participation. Government control con-
tinues very much in the fore, nevertheless, although the emphasis is
shifting more to public health and safety rather than common defense
and security.
A reason still given for continued control is that of security-
that the Government must retain tight control over special nuclear
material, that is, the fissionable energy-releasing material (currently
defined as uranium-233, uranium-235 and plutonium) which is vital to
both military and civilian usages, so that it does not fall into enemy
hands. The concept is a carryover from the days when many persons
visualized this country as being the only country possessing significant
amounts of such material. The soundness of the objective stressed by
this argument might yet be conceded as to weapons-grade material.
Even though some other countries are obviously quite competent in
producing this material and probably have little or no interest in
furtive acquisition of ours, it still may be wise to control our weapons-
grade material by not making it generally available, especially to smaller,
impulsive nations. It is interesting to note, in this connection, that
possession of this material by domestic private industry is no longer
attended by requirements for security, the assumption being that the
high cost of loss is sufficient incentive for safeguarding.'
An offer was made recently by our government to sell or lease to
foreign nations 20,000 kilograms of the special nuclear material U-235 6
(over twenty tons-enough for the operation of several millions of
kilowatts of electrical capacity or for 4,000 minimal size bombs 7).
Although the Commission has stated that the material will not be
exported in weapons-grade form (that is, the artificial enrichment of
natural uranium with U-235 will not exceed twenty per cent), that it
must be confined to the originally stated peaceful purposes and must
be reprocessed in commission-designated facilities,' it is difficult to
see how the latter measures can be enforced if the material is sold.
Furthermore, in the course of operation, many reactors create appre-,
ciable amounts of the special nuclear material plutonium or U-233 in
"blanket" material which would not be part of the fuel element, material
which would in fact be owned by the foreign country. Recovery of
this newly-formed material in highly pure form would be well within
5. Hearings, supra note 3, at 115.
6. N.Y. Times, Feb. 23, 1956, p. 14, col. 3.
7. Manchester Guardian Weeldy, March 1, 1956, p. 3, col. 1.
8. Atomic Industrial Forum Memo, June 1956, p. 24.
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the capacity of almost any country and no provision seemingly is to
be made that this material be reprocessed under commission surveil-
lance. The United Kingdom and Russia also should be in a position
to make offers of material in the near future, perhaps of highly enriched
weapons quality if they so desire. Accordingly, within a few years,
either by purchase or by the interim use of non-weapons grade U-235
or even natural uranium, foreign countries will be enabled to amass
weapon amounts of special nuclear material. The security basis for
continued government domestic control thus fades as quantities of
plutonium, U-233 and U-235 become generally available.
Another argument, also centering on special nuclear material, has
been that while this commodity remains scarce, while civilian demand
exceeds supply, the Government should be the party to decide what uses
are permitted and under what conditions. As has been suspected by
many, a fallacy in this argument now lies in its premise of material
shortage. This was amply demonstrated by the recently announced
availability of 40,000 kilograms of special nuclear material for private
use, 20,000 by domestic industry and 20,000, as already mentioned, for
sale or lease abroad.' A minimal size research reactor uses two to
three kilograms of such material,'" one 100,000 kilowatt prototype
power reactor now nearing completion requires only fifty-two kilo-
grams of such material," while two others, each of about 150,000
kilowatt capacity, will individually consume approximately 200 kilo-
grams of such material each year. 2
In making a fair estimate of the apparent material surplus, it must
be recognized that the 40,000 kilogram allocation probably is expected
to cover a period of several years and thus may not be in surplus at
the present time. However, three large gaseous diffusion plants under
government ownership are producing U-235; thirteen breeder piles,
also under government ownership, are producing Pu-239. This output
has been continuous for several years and it would seem that stocks of
material must be appreciable, probably much in excess of military
demands. The supply of ores from which special nuclear materials
are prepared is expanding rapidly; although the United States con-
tinues to support ore prices through 1966, Canada finds its reserves
now sufficient to justify termination of its government buying program.
The Commission has stated that it believes " peaceful uses will
9. N.Y. Times, Feb. 23, 1956, p. 14, col. 3.
10. Breazeale, Uses and Limitations of the Open-Pool Heterogeneous Research
Reactor, COMMERCIAL AND IN'rERNATIONAL DsVELoPMENTS IN ATOMIC ENERGY 132, 134
(Atomic Industrial Forum Report No. 7, 1956).
11. AEC News Release, No. 750, Dec. 29, 1955.
12. See AEC News Release, No. 823, May 4, 1956.
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not be limited by the availability of materials under any foreseeable
circumstances." '3 This material availability simultaneously weakens
another major reason for control which is manifested throughout the
1954 Act-that is, as a prerequisite for prompt recall of special nuclear
material for military purposes should the need arise.
A necessity to keep vital information from foreign powers is also
given as a reason for continued control. The extent and desirability of
restriction of information will be considered later. Suffice it to say, at
this point, that if a person is willing to undertake atomic ventures on
the basis of information which is unclassified, or which is available to
him by virtue of his satisfaction of personal security investigations,
then control over his activities, other than enforcement of precautionary
measures for protection of restricted information, contributes nothing
to this aspect of our national security.
Another important and often asserted reason for justifying con-
tinued government control is that achievements in atomic progress
paid for by the vast amounts of money spent by the Government to
date must not be made the subject of a giveaway to private industry.
By the end of 1956 these expenditures exceeded $15 billions. While
it should be pointed out that this money has also bought us military
strength and national defense, and that it has not succeeded in pro-
gressing science and engineering to the point of providing competitive
power, it must be admitted that almost any private atomic venture
would draw heavily on government-sponsored research in the past.
The immediate reaction of many persons is that this must vest a
public interest in all significant atomic ventures. One answer to this
attitude should be that the government program itself was founded
on the vast scientific knowledge which was acquired through the
efforts of innumerable scientific predecessors and subsequently made
available for unrestricted public use. Thus, the Government might
similarly dedicate its findings to the public domain without feeling that
such a contribution warranted retention of control over the activities
of those who thereafter utilize it. Also, it may well be that the public
can recoup its outlay by some means short of extending restriction of
enterprise into the indefinite future. Perhaps a fair share of public
investment could be recouped by charging industry royalties for patented
information which it utilizes and which has been collected by govern-
ment expenditures. The British apparently contemplate such a
measure. 14 If further progress in civilian application continues to be
financed by the Government, then public investment indeed may be-
13. Hearings, supra note 3, at 395.
14. See 178 THn EcoN oIST 687 (1956).
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come so heavy that the Government will be in control of the atomic
industry ad infinitum. At present, this appears a not unlikely prospect.
Any atomic project must involve more or less serious health and
safety hazards. These will be considered in detail later, but it is here
that the soundest reasons exist for moderate continued government
control. The Commission is virtually the only organization in this
country qualified by experience to dictate health and safety standards
for private atomic enterprise. It is fair and reasonable to require any
private venture to concern itself with the safety of its operation, al-
though this may well be done by regulation which falls somewhat short
of the degree of control that now obtains. Many other fields of
endeavor offer potential harm to the public, and their supervision either
by federal or state agency has not required detailed official intervention
into the business itself.
GOVERNMENT SPONSORSHIP
A problem closely related to that of government control over the
utilization of atomic energy is that of government sponsorship of such
utilization. During the period prior to the 1954 Act, wherein the
Government reserved essentially all atomic power activities to itself,
vast public expenditures were made, primarily on projects in further-
ance of national defense but with appreciable application to peaceful
power. It is conceded that the knowledge and skills obtained by
government expenditures to date, although sufficient to generate ap-
preciable amounts of electricity from atomic reactors, are inadequate to
enable the production of power competitive with conventional sources.'5
The status of the atomic power program is such that most, if not
all, of the fundamental theoretical work has been done. The remaining
and most expensive part is the construction of actual reactors, so that
the unpredictable engineering and technical difficulties found only in
large scale operation may be encountered and solved. Government and
industry are currently performing this function in several rather
distinct ways."6
Under the Five Year Reactor Development Program, initiated
in March 1954, prior to the 1954 Act, five different reactor prototypes
were selected by the Commission and are being constructed for it."
15. Hearings, supra note 3, at 323.
16. For a thorough resume of the AEC reactor program, see Northrop, The Chang-
ing Role of the Atomic Energy Commission in Atomic Power Development, 21 LAW &
CoNYzmp. PROB. 14 (1956); Roddis, AEC Power Demonstration Reactor Program,
COAMERCIAL AND INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS IN ATOMIC ENERGY 216 (Atomic
Industrial Forum Report No. 7, 1956).
17. Hearings, supra note 3, at 15; see Atomic Energy Act of 1954, §§ 31(a), 32,
68 STAT. 927, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2051(a), 2052 (Supp. III, 1955).
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The five types include pressurized water, boiling water, fast breeder,
sodium-graphite and homogeneous reactors. A sixth type, the organic
moderated reactor,18 and a seventh, the liquid metal fuel reactor,' 9 have
recently been contracted for under conditions of financing essentially
the same as for the first five types. An eighth type, a high temperature,
gas-cooled reactor, is contemplated.' For reasons escaping many
members of industry, no natural uranium power reactor is being under-
taken in this country. It is felt by many that such a reactor offers the
most attractive economics for the near future. Reactors under the
five-year program are being financed primarily by the government;
the basic purpose is to ascertain more definitely what reactor types
may prove commercially feasible and to make acquired information
available to everyone on equal terms. Accordingly, most of these
reactors are of small electrical kilowatt capacity.
With the passage of the 1954 Act, Congress indicated its intent
that industry should be allowed, in fact expected, to participate more
fully in this development of power.2' Probably the expectation of
many was that private industry would then forge ahead with power
development primarily at its own expense. However, soon after
passage of the act and before any private projects were proposed, the
Commission evolved the somewhat controversial Power Demonstration
Reactor Program.m This program was designed to assist private
development, under the anticipation that progress would thereby be
appreciably expedited. Basically, the program solicited bids for reactors
having electrical capacity in excess of 75,000 kilowatts. Construction
and ownership of the reactors were to be vested with industry, but for
those projects which the Commission believed would provide technical
and economic information not available theretofore, it offered moderate
aid in the form of a lump sum,23 waivers of charge for the use (not
consumption) of special nuclear material,' and assistance by govern-
ment laboratories in certain research and development work.25 Such
18. AEC News Release, No. 806, April 6, 1956.
19. AEC News Release, No. 824, May 6, 1956.
20. AEC News Release, No. 910, Oct. 19, 1956; AEC News Release, No. 832,
June 6, 1956.
21. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 3(d), 68 STA~T. 922, 42 U.S.C. § 2013(d) (Supp.
III, 1955).
22. AEC News Release, No. 589, Jan. 10, 1955; Hearings Before the Joint Com-
mittee on Atomic Energy, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 6, 152-64 (1955); MAixs & TRow-
BRDG, FR.m woax VoR ATo ic INDUsTRY 43-59 (1955); Roddis, supra note 16, at
216-23.
23. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 31(a), 68 STAT. 927, 42 U.S.C. § 2051 (a) (Supp.
III, 1955).
24. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, §§ 53(c), (d), 68 STAT. 930, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2093
(c),(d) (Supp. III, 1955).
25. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 33, 68 STAT. 928, 42 U.S.C. § 2053 (Supp. III,
1955).
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information as is obtained through this assistance is to belong to the
Commission. The program initially received some criticism, which
ultimately subsided, on the grounds that it represented an illegal
subsidy of private projects2
Four proposals were submitted under this first program," of
which three will apparently culminate in the construction of reactors
using the promised government assistance.28 During the period covered
by the first such program, a single private proposal also was made for
the construction of a reactor entirely with private funds. In addition,
one of the four applications under the demonstration program requested
aid only as to insurance and therefore was regarded merely as an
application for license. Interestingly, the first two construction permits
for large-scale private reactors, representing a combined electrical
capacity of 320,000 kilowatts of nuclear power, have gone to these two
applicants for reactors sponsored wholly by private capital.2" At least
four additional proposals are now under submission to the Commission
for smaller wholly private projects, one having been issued the third
construction permit.30 A "conditional" construction permit for a
major reactor under the first program has recently been issued.3 1
Shortly after the closing date of the first demonstration program, a
second program was announced, 2 offering the same aid as the first
plus an alternative of commission financing of, and retention of title to,
all or part of the reactor system.33 This program was for reactors in
the 5,000-40,000 electrical kilowatt capacity range, thereby offering
assistance to smaller groups who were financially unsuited for projects
under the original program. Seven proposals were made under the
second program. 4 The interest in taking advantage of that assistance
which entails commission financing of the reactor system was quite
pronounced and, to advocates of privately-supported endeavor, rather
disappointing. This type of government aid strongly resembles the
original five-year program and unavoidably creates an air of hesitation
on the part of industry. Such assistance also falls squarely within that
part of the act which gives preference for power so produced to public
26. Hearings, supra note 22, at 152-64; see Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 169, 68
STAT. 952, 42 U.S.C. § 2209 (Supp. III, 1955).
27. AEC News Release, No. 620, April 7, 1955.
28. See AEC News Release, No. 833, June 6, 1956.
29. See AEC News Release, No. 823, May 4, 1956.
30. AEC News Release, No. 903, Oct. 5, 1956; AEC News Release, No. 829, May
15, 1956.
31. Atomic Industrial Forum Memo, Aug. 1956, p. 11.
32. AEC News Release, No. 695, Sept. 21, 1955.
33. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 31(a), 68 STAT. 927, 42 U.S.C. § 2051 (a)
(Supp. Il, 1955).
34. See AEC News Release, No. 777, Feb. 7, 1956.
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bodies, cooperatives and private bodies operating in high cost areas.3 5
A third program has recently been announced by the Commission.
No cut-off date for proposals was prescribed but all proposed reactors
are required to be completed by June 30, 1963. No limitations as to
reactor type or size were made but the Commission indicated its
readiness to undertake federal construction of some particular types
if private bids thereon are not forthcoming."
As of early 1956, the Commission's five-year program involved
the proposed expenditure of $222 millions of government money, $20
millions of private capital; the power demonstration program, $55
millions of government money, $110 millions of private capital; the
independent private projects, $145 millions of private capital."0 Un-
questionably, a major deterrent to private investment has been a
realization that nuclear power will not be competitive with power
from conventional sources for many years. Electrical power generation
costs range from four to seven mills per kilowatt-hour over most of
this country. In contrast, nuclear-powered electricity from the first
completed reactor will cost fifty-two mills; 7 from a subsequent reactor
by the same manufacturer, fifteen to eighteen mills."' Other reactors,
still in the planning stage, are expected to have costs of about nine to
ten mills." Predictions that nuclear power costs will drop to a com-
petitive level by 1965 or 1970 do not suggest that nuclear power ever
is likely to appreciably undersell that from conventional sources.4" In
light of such economics, it is understandable that industry proceeds
with deliberation. Such motivation as exists is probably primarily a
desire to retain the atomic power program in private hands. The pace
is accordingly slower than many would like and leads to such comments
as that "the United States has no civilian atomic energy program
worthy of the name.
Many feel that, with its already vast investment and in light of
the slow private progress, the Government should complete the quest
for competitive atomic power, or at least undertake a public power
35. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 44, 68 SrAr. 929, 42 U.S.C. § 2064 (Supp. III,
1955).
35a. AEC News Release, No. 953, Jan. 7, 1957.
36. Hearings, supra note 3, at 341.
37. AEC Press Seminar on Civilian Power Reactor Development, Dec. 6, 1955,
p. 37.
38. Atomic Industrial Forum Memo, June 1956, p. 57.
39. See Hearings, supra note 3, at 238; Atomic Industrial Forum Memo, June
1956, p. 40.
40. See Hearings, supra note 3, at 577-82; cf. Atomic Industrial Forum Memo,
Aug. 1956, p. 42.
41. Hearings, supra note 3, at 217.
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program concurrently with that of industry. One of the most in-
fluential and outspoken advocates of renewed public power develop-
ment is Commissioner Murray:
"The prospect of getting industrial atomic power in the near
future is very gloomy. The Government has prematurely abdi-
cated to private industry the primary responsibility for building
large power reactors. Important reactor types have been 'staked
out' by individual companies or groups. Yet there is no firm
assurance that these and other power reactors will be built in the
near future. Repeating a recommendation made last February,
I again urge the Government to assume the primary responsibility
for large reactor construction." '
This attitude was largely submerged in the 1954 Act, but it surfaced
briefly in that section which precludes the Commission from engaging
in the sale or distribution of power for commercial use n--the proviso
is there made that power sold from commission research facilities shall
go preferentially to public bodies and cooperatives or to utilities serving
high cost areas-and in that section which gives commercial facility
license preferences in essentially the same manner." Private power
proponents have attacked even these provisions. However, the act
specifically states that other government agencies authorized to pro-
duce, market or distribute electric energy for ultimate public consump-
tion shall not be barred by the act from obtaining commercial facility
licenses.4 5
Others feel that, with its military purposes largely accomplished,
the Government should no longer compete in the power field but should
release as much of it to private enterprise as the latter is willing to
undertake.4 Of these, some would hold the Government in readiness
to push forward immediately on whatever experimental fronts the
42. Statement of Commissioner Thomas E. Murray before the congressional
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, June 18, 1956. See also Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy, Amending the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, as Amended, and for Other
Purposes, H.R. REP. No. 2181, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 119-20 (1954) (minority); Hear-
ings, supra note 3, at 197-208, 270, 289-320 (statement of Commissioner Murray), 473-
89, 505-22, 548-61, 561-65; Hearings, supra note 22, at 337-51, 427-68, 522; Atomic In-
dustrial Forum Memo, June 1956, pp. 9-16; MARUs & TRowrnunc4, op. cit. Supra note
22, at 38.
43. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 44, 68 STAT. 929, 42 U.S.C. § 2064 (Supp. III,
1955).
44. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 182(c), 68 STAT. 953, 42 U.S.C. § 2232(c)
(Supp. III, 1955).
45. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 273, 68 STAT. 960, 42 U.S.C. § 2020 (Supp. III,
1955).
46. See Atomic Industrial Forum Memo, June 1956, pp. 9-16. For a general descrip-
tion of public investment, see Tybout, The Public Investment in Atomic Power De-
velopment, 21 LAW & CONiZMP. PROB. 60 (1956).
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Commission deems promising but in which industry lags.4 7  This latter
view summarizes the current position of the Commission.
Although the pendulum is currently on the side of private power
development, it may very well have several swings left in it-the
issue between public and private atomic power is far from settled and
will be much influenced by the political tides.48  One proposal, passed
by the Senate but rejected by the House during the last session of
Congress, was the Gore bill,4 a proposal for the public construction
of prototype power reactors in this country and abroad. The opinion
of many is that such a bill still may result in legislation in the near
future. If such a program materializes, further expenditure of private
funds for prototype reactor development almost certainly will be
curtailed.
Under government-sponsored research, the cost is borne by the
taxpayer and all licensees are free to take advantage of the resultant
progress. Under privately-sponsored research, the cost of progress
is borne by limited groups-i.e., the cost of private power development
would fall largely on the utility companies and, depending upon the
attitude of state regulatory agencies, ultimately would be shifted to
consumers or shareholders. The consumer seems destined to sustain
most of the loss, whether the extra cost of nuclear power is incorporated
into the rate base of the utility or itemized as an expense, the latter
decreasing shareholder profits temporarily but supporting a claim for
rate increases if the residual return on the rate base is not fair."° Even
that part which is temporarily charged to shareholder profits probably
would be reduced fifty-two per cent by decreased income taxes.5 It
cannot be expected, of course, that private groups will be anxious to
pay for developments which thereafter can be exploited freely by others.
Thus, interest in private development unquestionably suffers from the
absence of a satisfactory means for eventually shifting a fair proportion
of the development cost to other groups which later desire to take
advantage of the knowledge so obtained.
47. See 1 PANEL ON THE IMPACT OF THE PEACEFUL UsEs oF ATOMIc ENERGY,
PEACEFUL USES OF ATOmic ENERGY 249 (Report to the Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy 1956) ; Hearings, supra note 3, at 323.
48. See Atomic Industrial Forum Memo, Sept. 1956, p. 7; Atomic Energy Clearing
House, May 28, 1956, pp. 5-8 (summary of hearings on public power before the con-
gressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy) ; Wall Street Journal, May 15, 1956,
p. 1, col. 6; Wall Street Journal, March 22, 1956, p. 10, col. 3. See also Marks, Public
Power and Atomic Power Development, 21 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 132 (1956).
49. S. 4146, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956) (Sen. Albert Gore). See Atomic Energy
Clearing House, June 4, 1956, pp. 4-7; Atomic Energy Clearing House, May 28, 1956,
pp. 5-8 (summary of hearings on public power before the congressional Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy).
50. See Hearings, supra note 3, at 246-47.
51. See U.S. TwEAs. Rto. § 1.11-1.
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In view of the relatively inexpensive power already available in
the United States from conventional sources, it would be satisfactory
domestically to let private enterprise develop atomic power at a rate
set only by the pressure of competition. However, the international
consequences of atomic power, i.e., the prestige which will go to the
country which first can provide economic nuclear reactors on an inter-
national market, seemingly demand an accelerated and artificial rate
of progress. With a few exceptions, and with described justification,
industry has been markedly conservative in placing its own capital
into prototype nuclear reactors, the consequence being relatively re-
tarded power development. This reticence undoubtedly is heightened
by threat of the re-entry of a public power program. Industry will
be hard pressed to find logical objection if the proposed government
return to public atomic power materializes.
ACCESS TO ATOMIC INFORMATION
Any person who intends to participate in activities concerning
atomic energy has a natural and sensible desire to know as much as
possible of the information already available in his field of interest.
However, he will find the availability of much of his needed information
complicated to an extent wholly different from almost anything in his
prior experience. It is an international tradition in the physical sciences
that every scientist who makes an appreciable advance in his art will
report his findings in some appropriate periodical. The system of
reporting is not unlike that which is undertaken in the field of law on
a national scale. The lawyer has his Shepard's Citations, the scientist
has his Chemical Abstracts; the lawyer has his regional reporters, the
scientist has his Physical Review; the list of counterparts runs on
extensively. Thus, within the few weeks' delay required for publica-
tion, or perhaps a somewhat longer delay required for patent applica-
tion, workers in science are kept abreast of the latest developments
throughout the world. This tradition doubtless contributes greatly to
the rapid technical progress of modern industry.
It was precisely this system which brought word of uranium
nuclear fission from Europe to America in the late 1930's. If this
discovery had been made in a peaceful world, atomic energy now still
might be a science as open and free from restriction as any other.
However, because of the impending war in Europe, leading scientists
from many countries congregated in the United States. Realizing the
strategic military importance of their work, they initially imposed upon
themselves a voluntary censorship as to publication of their subsequent
work. Later, as the Government began to finance this research and
1957] GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF ATOMIC INDUSTRY 307
development, secrecy became a contractual imposition. In addition,
successive governmental censorship bodies achieved the co-operation
of editors of American scientific journals in suppressing reports of
work in the nuclear area. Thus, all developments in this field rapidly
came under government control and the output of published scientific
reports concerning fission, uranium and plutonium dwindled to es-
sentially nothing.
Under the 1946 and 1954 Acts, scientific data is born restricted
if it concerns atomic weapons, production of special nuclear material
or its utilization in the production of energy P-although properly
denoted as "restricted data," this is often referred to as classified data.
The hallmark of restricted data denotes that it is available only to
persons having governmental approval. The Commission has only
that right to control information which is given to it by the act.' 3
Declassification of restricted data, that is, putting it into the public
domain, is permitted, is in fact required, when the Commission deter-
mines that it may be done without "undue risk to the common defense
and security." 4 This mandate is generally conceded to indicate a
congressional intent that information should be more freely circulated
than was the case under the 1946 Act, which permitted declassification
only when it would not adversely affect the common defense and
security; however, disagreement still exists as to the degree intended.
Any prospective contract, arrangement with, or license from, the
Commission must be preceded by a written promise that the recipient
of restricted data shall not permit access of any person thereto until
such person has a security clearance according to standards prescribed
by the Commission and administered by the Civil Service Commis-
sion. 5 Except by special authorization of the Commission or the
General Manager, the recipient himself must have a similar clearance.
The Commission has the power to adopt such regulations as it deems
necessary to protect restricted data. 6
In practice, taking a statutory hint,57 the Commission has designed
a system for distributing restricted data which categorizes it into several
52. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 11(r), 68 STAT. 924, 42 U.S.C. § 2014 (Supp.
III, 1955).
53. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 146(b), 68 STAT. 943, 42 U.S.C. § 2166(b)
(Supp. III, 1955).
54 Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 142(a), 68 STAT. 941, 42 U.S.C. § 2162(a)
(Supp. III, 1955). See also Atomic Energy Act of 1954, §§ 3(b), 141, 68 STAT. 922,
940, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2013(b), 2161 (Supp. III, 1955).
55. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 145, 68 STAT. 942, 42 U.S.C. § 2165 (Supp. III,
1955).
56. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 161(i), 68 STAT. 949, 42 U.S.C. § 2201(i)
(Supp. III, 1955) ; see 21 F4D. RrG. 718 (1956) (10 C.F.R. pt. 95).
57. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, §§ 141(b), 145(b), (f), 68 STAT. 940, 942, 943,
42 U.S.C. §§ 2161(b), 2165(b), (f) (Supp. III, 1955).
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degrees of secrecy, thereafter making it available only to persons having
a commission-issued access permit together with an appropriate secu-
rity clearance.5 Top-secret data has high military significance and is
unavailable to anyone for private enterprise purposes. Secret data is of
intermediate importance and can be received by anyone having a
corresponding access permit and a "Q" security clearance, the most
stringent clearance given for private purposes. Confidential data is
the lowest grade restricted data and can be received by anyone having
an access permit and an "L" clearance, the latter involving a relatively
cursory security investigation of the individual." Restricted data
may also be made available to cleared licensees; normally, however, a
person will require an access permit so as to investigate the pertinent
information in advance of any request for license."
To get an access permit, the applicant must first promise to comply
with all provisions of the act and regulations; he must waive all claims
for the just compensation which the statute otherwise offers him
should the Commission divulge to another nation information contained
in certain of his patent applications; he must waive statutory provisions
for damages if a secrecy order is imposed upon his patent applications;
and he must waive all claims against the Government that might arise
in connection with the use of information obtained pursuant to the
permit.61 Justification for such mandatory waiver of statutory damages
and just compensation seems noticeably lacking; elimination of these
requirements, which are not designed to advance security of the in-
formation, reasonably may be suggested. In some cases they may
present a serious obstacle to acquisition of information by an interested
person, i.e., permits granting access for members of companies or
partnerships must be issued to the companies or partnerships; 62 these
latter entities may balk at making such waivers, thereby defeating the
individual's access. •
Access permits for confidential data are being granted for any
reasonable purpose or potential use outlined by the applicant, including
a mere survey of the information to see if the applicant later might
desire to enter the field actively. For an access permit to secret data,
58. 21 FED. REG. 810, 3103 (1956) (10 C.F.R. pt. 4) ; see AEC News Release, No.
626, April 20, 1955; Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Amending the Atomic Energy
Act of 1946, as Amended, and for Other Purposes, H.R. RaP. No, 2181, 83d Cong.,
2d Sess. 7, 24 (1954). For a description and criticism of the access permit system, see
Green, Information Control and Atomic Power Development, 21 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 91 (1956).
59. Hearings, supra note 22, at 13-15.
60. Manley, Industrial Participation, ATOMIc ENERGY-THX NXW INDUSTRIAL
FRONTIER 92, 97 (Atomic Industrial Forum Report 1955).
61. 21 FED. R . 811 (1956) (10 C.F.R. § 25.23(c)).
62. Ibid. (10 C.F.R. § 25.11).
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however, the Commission also exercises its own judgment as to the
applicant's "need for such data." 63 Although this might seem to exceed
a mere security measure, it probably represents only a realization of
the fact that every permittee constitutes a potential loss of secrecy;
if this risk is to be assumed for the more vital information, it should
have more than casual interest to the recipient. Both secret and
confidential data can be exchanged directly between persons holding
the appropriate permit and clearance."'
Once a person has passed into the inner sanctum of access-permit
holders, he receives extensive information disseminated by the Com-
mission and intended to enable him to locate that data of most interest
to him.65 In general, this aid makes it at least as easy to find pertinent
information as if it had been published in the customary scientific
literature.
The dissemination system adopted by the Commission has received
some commendation from outside the Commission; it has also received
an appreciable amount of criticism,66 including that from the chairman
of the Joint Committee,6 7 both as representing a delay in the more
desirable declassification and as being inherently impractical. There
is probably no one who would seriously advocate total declassification of
all data concerning atomic energy. Publication of some information
peculiar to atomic weapons or military usage could lead to highly
detrimental consequences. But with this premise, of course, the problem
arises as to where and how a line must be drawn. Obviously it cannot
be drawn by statute; discretion must be given the Commission. In
essence, the gradating scheme of top-secret, secret, confidential and
declassified information follows from the inability to draw a sharp
distinction. It also must be remembered that this scheme was originally
envisaged by Congress, not the Commission. Inasmuch as the scheme
accomplishes appreciable declassification and permits access to all but
top-secret data by persons who can justify their inquiry, it seems
designed to carry out the spirit of the act to a satisfactory extent.
Some dissension must naturally arise as to the basis for placing
particular information in any selected category. Inspections of the
wealth of restricted data recently downgraded or declassified (i.e.,
31,000 documents reviewed in eleven weeks) make it quite apparent
63. Ibid. (10 C.F.R. § 25.15(b)).
64. Id. at 719 (10 C.F.R. § 95.31).
65. See Hearings Before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 84th Cong., 2d
Sess. 54-57, 75-77 (1956).
66. See, e.g., Green, supra note 58.
67. See Address by Senator Clinton P. Anderson, Nuclear Science and Engineering
Congress, Dec. 15, 1955, cited in Atomic Industrial Forum Memo, Jan. 1956, p. 7.
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that such relaxation was long overdue in many instances. 68 The better
share of the data declassified is of a kind which any competent worker
could acquire, given the time and equipment. No revolutionary con-
cepts seem to have been divulged. It probably may be fairly assumed
that downgrading within the restricted categories has much the same
characteristics. It has been said, as may in fact be the case, that most,
if not all, the basic fundamentals of science known today lie in the
declassified area.
Further declassification is permitted pursuant to recent relaxation
of the Tripartite Declassification Guide used by the United States,
Canada and the United Kingdom."'
The obvious justification for restricting data is to retard the
military progress of unfriendly countries. Doubtless some restricted
information would be immensely valuable to an unfriendly power; yet,
much of it has unquestionably been developed independently by other
countries, as was clearly evident at Geneva when the United States,
the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union found themselves each
harboring secret data which agreed almost to the letter. 9 We also
handicap ourselves to an appreciable extent by anything less than free
disclosure. Scientists universally agree that restriction of data leads
to duplication and retarding of domestic research. The atom and fis-
sion were discovered in an academic atmosphere of virtually free pub-
lication of research results. Governmental regulation of scientific
publication in a few key countries probably could have postponed these
discoveries far into the future. Analogously, our present day secrecy
may very well deprive many of our own scientists of basic facts which
•would serve them as stepping stones to future discoveries. Basic ad-
vances in science frequently stem from university faculty members; yet
some leading universities in this country, justifiably or not, refuse to
traffic in restricted data, thus depriving themselves of information and
the country of valuable progress.7' This adverse consequence of secrecy
may well be one of the most critical.
Other practical bases suggested for the secrecy program have been
less concerned with security. One of these is the use of classified data
as a political tool-to be apportioned out at times and places and to
selected recipients, primarily foreign countries, in ways designed to
strengthen this country's political advantage. If this is the case, such
68. AEC News Release, No. 799, March 20, 1956.
68a. Atomic Industrial Forum Memo, Jan. 1957, pp. 6-9.
69. McCune, Business Opportunities in Atomic Energy, COmmERCIAL AND INTER-
NATIONAL DZVML0PMXNTS IN ATo Ic ENERGY 167, 169 (Atomic Industrial Forum
Report No. 7, 1956).
70. Atomic Industrial Forum Memo, April 1956, p. 14.
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a philosophy should be publicly aired and opened for discussion of the
merits. Still another alleged use of secrecy has been to deny informa-
tion to persons who otherwise might oppose projects undertaken--or
who might instigate embarrassing investigations into supposed com-
mission mismanagement.
A further criticism of the secrecy program is that whenever in-
formation is selectively disseminated, someone is going to be treated
unfairly. Perhaps the most forceful demonstration of this lies in the
area of top-secret information which is not available for private purposes
of any kind. A select group out of private industry has been in a con-
tractual relationship with the Commission for many years, in the course
of which top-secret data was necessarily imparted to, and developed by,
them. When persons from within this group compete with non-mem-
bers for private business, it is inevitable that they may profit to some
extent by virtue of this inside experience with the Commission. 7 Of
course, it often may be that this is the only real profit they secure by
their contractual projects, many of which are undertaken for only a
token fee.7' The problem is as serious as it is unanswerable. It is
complicated by the fact that these insiders are generally the large cor-
porations which already have an edge in pioneering because of their
size. One maneuver of self-help by outsiders has been the raiding of
employees, both from within the Commission and from the insiders of
industry. Presumably nothing but total abandonment of secrecy would
completely alleviate this situation.
The general tone of public opinion, including many former com-
mission staff members, seems to be that declassification of information
should be expanded.m Yet, while the statutory standard continues to
emphasize the potential harm from declassification rather than potential
benefit to peaceful utilization, it does not seem that much fault can be
found in the basic approach of the Commission. Even the scientists
disagree among themselves as to which direction any change in the
status quo should take.74 So long as the present scheme permits access,
by persons showing legitimate need, to all data which could be made
public under the most extreme declassification proposals, any chafing
by those who are unable to satisfy idle curiosity seems a slight price to
pay for whatever security the plan may provide.
71. 1 PANSL' ON THE IMPACT Or Tr PIACEVUL USeS op AoMIc EmmGY, op. ci.
supra note 47, at 108; Green, supra note 58, at 100.
72. See Hearings, supra note 65, at 452-54.
73. See Hearings, supra note 22, at 261-67, 323, 542-50; 2 PANEL ON THE IMPACT OP
THE PErACEUL UsEs or ATOMIC ENERGY, op. cit. supra note 47, at 10, 109; Parsegian,
Personnel Requirements, ATOMIC ENERGY-A REALsTIc APPRAISAL 17, 20 (Atomic
Industrial Forum Report 1955).
74. See, e.g., 12 Buu.m ATOMIC ScIwNTis's 23, 135 (1956); 11 BuLT. AToMIc
ScIENTISTS 275 (1955).
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OBTAINING NUCLEAR MATERIALS
An industry which has procured adequate information to embark
on a desired program must then adjust to operation under the govern-
ment licensing program.' 5 A unique aspect of the atomic business is that
the Government owns or controls the energy-producing chemical ele-
ments upon which the industry is founded and dependent. Private pos-
session can be only under license. Two of the pertinent elements involved
in the production of power-thorium and uranium-occur in nature in
the customary form of ores. A third, plutonium, is a synthetic element
which is made from uranium. The consequences of this government
ownership and control of nuclear materials are directly imposed upon
a private undertaking in two critical ways-availability and price.
Source Material
Thorium and uranium are defined by statute as "source mate-
rial"-so named because they are the source of special nuclear ma-
terials, those materials releasing energy by nuclear fission.
"The term 'source material' means (1) uranium, thorium, or
any other material which is determined by the Commission pur-
suant to the provisions of section 61 to be source material; or (2)
ores containing one or more of the foregoing materials, in such
concentration as the Commission may by regulation determine
from time to time." 76
Power is given the Commission to add materials to this definition with
assent of the President.77 The open-end definition is intended to cor-
respond with possible expansion of the special nuclear material cate-
gory. Although the definition of the statute is technically ambiguous,
it presumably means natural thorium (which is 100% isotope 232)
and natural uranium (which is 99.28% isotope 238, 0.71% isotope
235 and 0.006% isotope 234). While these elements are left in their
place of deposit in nature, no government control is imposed. Al-
though private ownership of source material may be permitted at any
stage,
"unless authorized by a general or specific license issued by the
Commission, . . . no person may transfer or receive in inter-
state commerce, transfer, deliver, receive possession of or title to,
75. 21 FSD. RtG. 804 (1956) (10 C.F.R. pt. 2).
76. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 11(s), 68 STAT. 924, 42 U.S.C. § 2014(s) (Supp.
III, 1955).
77. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 61, 68 STAT. 932, 42 U.S.C. § 2091 (Supp. III,
1955).
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or import into or export from the United States any source material
after removal from its place of deposit in nature, except that
licenses shall not be required for quantities of source material
which, in the opinion of the Commission, are unimportant." 78
Privately owned source material, moreover, is always subject to
condemnation and acquisition by the Commission, "' albeit with a pro-
vision for just compensation. 0
The statute authorizes the Commission to become a buyer of
source material at prices which it may guarantee for a specified time-
upon which the statute sets no limit."1 This authorization is being
used by extension of regulations adopted under the 1946 Act and the
current price for most domestic raw source material, or ore, is guar-
anteed through March 31, 1962.8 Also, under these regulations, some
guaranteed minimum prices exist for domestic refined uranium, high
grade ores and mechanical concentrates through 1958. This departure
from competitive price setting is asserted to be required to stimulate
development of adequate supplies of material-perhaps the striking
success in uranium exploration is, in fact, appreciably due to such
policy.
A major criticism of the current policy, interestingly, has urged
guaranteed prices for longer periods of time as a further incentive to
continued prospecting and exploration. In response to the criticism
and with the intention of further encouraging prospecting for new
uranium deposits, the Commission has announced that it will continue
its domestic uranium procurement program with a guaranteed price
for domestic-milled concentrates of uranium oxide for the period from
April 1, 1962 through December 31, 1966.83 The Commission recog-
nizes, however, that this extension is a prelude to an eventual transi-
tion to a free market.
Once the ore has been mined, the next process is to mill and refine
it so as to place it in a form suitable for utilization. This utilization
78. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 62, 68 STAT. 932, 42 U.S.C. § 2092 (Supp. III,
1955). See also Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 63(a), 65, 69, 68 STAT. 933, 934, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2093(a), 2095, 2099 (Supp. III, 1955); 10 C.F.R. pt. 40 (Supp. 1955). The
source material regulations represent an extension of those adopted under the 1946 Act.
Part 40 grants a general license to certain persons-the same persons are exempted from
material license requirements under the by-product and special nuclear material regula-
tions. Presumably they will be exempted likewise when part 40 is revised.
79. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 66, 68 STAT. 933, 42 U.S.C. § 2096 (Supp. III,
1955).
80. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 171, 68 STAT. 952, 42 U.S.C. § 2221 (Supp. III,
1955).
81. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 66, 68 STAT. 933, 42 U.S.C. § 2096 (Supp. III,
1955).
82. 10 C.F.R. pt. 60 (Supp. 1955).
83. AEC News Release, No. 830, May 24, 1956.
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may either be of the refined form in natural uranium reactors or it may
involve still further processing into feed material for isotopic separation
processes. Private industry, as well as the Government, could perform
this milling and refining if the appropriate material license were ob-
tained, i.e., industry could buy the ore at the government-determined
price and then offer milled and refined source material for competitive
sale to licensed users. However, in current practice, the ore is milled
and refined almost exclusively in government-owned or contracted-for
facilities. As has been mentioned, the procurement plan from 1962-
1966 will shift from ores to concentrates prepared by private domestic
mills. At present, the Government is the only important market for
the refined material, which it then uses in plutonium breeding reactors
or converts into feed material. The latter also has been prepared only
in government facilities thus far. 4  Recent developments indicate that
private industry also may eventually become a supplier of both refined
metals and feed material.85
The process thus described sets a somewhat artificial floor on
the price of fuel for atomic power, whether the source material be used
in its purified form or enriched to make special nuclear material. The
effect will be essentially the same under the extended fixed prices for
concentrates or under a potential scheme of set prices for the refined
metals. While fuel prices may prove to be one of the lesser components
of the cost of nuclear power, continued examination ought to be given
to a government buying policy which helps determine the economics of
nuclear power and which subsidizes an element of the mining industry
in a manner which could make "the silver buying program .
look like a church sale." 86 The day ought to come when there need
be no price guarantee for any nuclear material and when the continua-
tion of any government buying program would no longer dictate the
market price.
The statute directs the Commission to make a "reasonable charge"
for source material to be "distributed" for commercial uses but allows
it discretion as to whether it will make such a charge for research
84. Hearings Before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 84th Cong., 1st
Sess. 71 (1955); Kelley, Uranium Feed Materials Production, COMMERCIAL AND
INTERNATIONAL DEvELoPMENTS IN ATOMIc ENERGY 394 (Atomic Industrial Forum
Report No. 7, 1956).
85. See AEC News Release, No. 901, Oct. 3, 1956; AEC News Release, No. 740,
Dec. 12, 1955; AEC News Release, No. 722, Oct. 27, 1955; AEC News Release, No.
676, Aug. 9, 1955; Hearings, supra note 65, at 81; Discussion on Fuels and Source
Materials, COMMERCIAL AND INTrRNATIONAL DXVLOPMXNTS I N ATOMIC EN GRY 430,
431 (Atomic Industrial Forum Report No. 7, 1956).
86. The Nation, March 31, 1956, p. 256. See also Hearings, supra note 65, at 89,
90, 306-10; 1 PANEL ON THE IMPACT OF THE PEACEFUL USES OF AToIic ENERGY,
op. cit. supra note 47, at 15, 131, 143. For a general discussiori of material pricing,
see Patrick, The Pricing of Special Nuclear Material, 31 LAND ECON. 339 (1955).
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and development type usage.8 7  The price, where charged, is to
"be established on such a nondiscriminatory basis as, in the
opinion of the Commission, will provide reasonable compensation
to the Government for such material . . . and will not dis-
courage the development of sources of supply independent of the
Commission." 88
The latter clause, if taken at face value, seemingly would preclude
any sale at materially less than the cost of production. The Commis-
sion has indicated that it would charge the price quoted by industry,
if such a situation arises, where this is higher than the Commission's
cost of production. 9
Special Nuclear Material
A problem of more importance to industry than the use of source
material is that of use of the government-owned "special nuclear
material." "0
"The term 'special nuclear material' means (1) plutonium,
uranium enriched in the isotope 233 or in the isotope 235, and any
other material which the Commission, pursuant to the provisions
of section 51, determines to be special nuclear material, but does
not include source material; or (2) any material artificially
enriched by any of the foregoing, but does not include source
material." "'
Possession or transfer of this material likewise is forbidden except
under general or special license.
"It shall be unlawful for any person to-
(1) possess or transfer any special nuclear material
which is the property of the United States except as authorized
by the Commission . .;
(2) transfer or receive any special nuclear material in
interstate commerce except as authorized by the Commission
. . . or export from or import into the United States any
special nuclear material. ,"
87. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 63(c), 68 STAT. 933, 42 U.S.C. § 2093(c) (Supp.
III, 1955).
88. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 161(m), 68 STAT. 950, 42 U.S.C. § 2201(m)
(Supp. III, 1955).
89. See Hearings, supra note 65, at 85.
90. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, §§ 2(h), 52, 53(e) (1), 183(a), (b), 68 STAT.
922, 929, 931, 954, 42 U.S.C. §2012(h), 2072, 2073(e) (1), 2233(a), (b) (Supp. III,
1955).
91. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 11(t), 68 STAT. 924, 42 U.S.C. § 2014(t) (Supp.
III, 1955).
92. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, §57(a), 68 STAT. 932, 42 U.S.C. §2077(a)
(Supp. III, 1955). See also Atomic Energy Act of 1954, §§ 53, 57(b), 161(b), 68
STAT. 930, 932, 948, 42 U.S.C. §§2073, 2077(b), 2201(b) (Supp. III, 1955) ; 21 Fm.
Rm. 765 (1956) (10 C.F.R. pt. 70) (limited exemptions are made in §§ 70.11-14).
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The term "enrichment," as applied to special nuclear material, is
of ambiguous definition but is commonly used to denote absolute
content of these three isotopes. That is, a fuel of 2%o enriched uranium
would be comprised of 98%o U-238 and 2% U-235, achieved by the
addition of approximately 1.3% U-235 to the 0.7% U-235 already
present in natural uranium.
Special nuclear materials are the only known materials which
have properties sufficient to merit practical consideration for controlled
energy production (even the use of natural uranium depends upon its
content of U-235). Provision is made for classification by the
Commission, with assent of the President, of other materials as special
nuclear material-a classification left open-ended in anticipation of
including fusionable materials at some future date." Private owners
must be paid just compensation at the time of such deprivation of
ownership.""
The production of special nuclear material from source material
legally could be done in privately-owned facilities under government
license. 5 As a practical matter, however, it is highly difficult atid
expensive as a primary undertaking and, aside from incidental produc-
tion in private reactors, is being done today only in government-owned
facilities. Uranium-235 is separated from the much more abundant
U-238, with which it occurs in natural uranium, by a gaseous diffusion
process-the Government currently operating three such diffusion
plants. Plutonium-239 is produced from U-238 in breeder reactors
-chemical separation of these different elements being relatively simple
-the Government currently operating thirteen of these reactors.
Uranium-233 is similarly produced from Th-232, although no facilities
are yet known to be devoted primarily to its production.
The Commission is required to make a "reasonable charge" for
use of the material for commercial purposes and is given discretion,
to be exercised in accordance with established written criteria, as to
whether it will make such a charge for research and development
purposes.96 Use of material is distinguished from consumption of
material because only a small part of the material held in inventory by
the licensee will be consumed before it is returned for reprocessing.
In calculating this reasonable charge for use, several factors other than
93. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 51, 68 STAT. 929, 42 U.S.C. § 2071 (Supp. III,
1955).
94. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, §§ 52, 171, 68 STAT. 929, 952, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2072,
2221 (Supp. III, 1955).
95. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, §§ 41(a), (c), 68 STAT. 928, 929, 42 U.S.C.
§§2061(a), (c) (Supp. III, 1955).
96. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 53(c), 68 STAT. 930, 42 U.S.C. § 2073(c)
(Supp. III, 1955) ; see Hearing;s, supra note 84, at 74.
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the cost of production are to be considered, centering primarily on the
nature of the proposed usage. 7  Only for commercial usage is the
charge required to be uniform and nondiscriminatory, insofar as is
practicable. In addition, special nuclear material actually consumed
by the commercial user must be compensated for by a further charge,
based on the lower of the Commission's estimate of its own cost of
production or the "average fair price" paid to private producers of
such material. 8 Charges for consumption by research and develop-
ment licensees, like charges for use, are left to the discretion of the
Commission. 9 In using its rather broad powers, the Commission has
said that prices for all uses or consumption of nuclear materials will
be uniformly applied, except where ad hoc waiver of charges for
research and development purposes may be made.1'0 For research
reactors operated by nonprofit institutions, the Commission may waive
both use and consumption charges, as well as offering free fabrication
of fuel elements and reprocessing of spent fuel.' 0 '
In the course of using either source or special nuclear material in
his reactor, the private owner will find that he inevitably produces
other special nuclear material, either U-233 or Pu-239. Since the
Government instantly becomes the owner of this material, he must deal
with it as the Government prescribes. The act states that he shall
receive a "fair price" for it (not "just compensation") :
"All rights, title, and interest in or to any special nuclear
material within or under the jurisdiction of the United States, now
or hereafter produced, shall be the property of the United States.
. . . . Any person owning any interest in any special nuclear
material . . . shall be paid just compensation therefor. Any
person who lawfully produces any special nuclear material . .
shall be paid a fair price . . . for producing such material." 102
This fair price shall apply to all licensed producers of the same material
but is to be determined primarily with regard for its intended use by
the Government and secondarily with regard for its cost of produc-
97. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 53(d), 68 STAT. 930, 42 U.S.C. § 2073(d)
(Supp. III, 1955).
98. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 53(d) (5), 68 STAT. 931,42 U.S.C. § 2073(d) (5)
(Supp. III, 1955).
99. Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Amending the Atomic Energy Act of
1946, as Amended, and for Other Purposes, H.R. REP. No. 2181, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.
16 (1954).
100. AEC News Release, No. 590, Jan. 10, 1955; AEC News Release, No. 589, Jan.
10, 1955; Hearings, supra note 84, at 74, 180; MARKs & TRoWIDGE, FRA mWoRK VoR
ATomic INDUSTRY 52 (1955).
101. AEC News Release, No. 883, Sept. 5, 1956; AEC News Release, No. 684,
Aug. 28, 1955.
102. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 52, 68 STAT. 929, 42 U.S.C. § 2072 (Supp. III,
1955).
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tion.Y Some of the material produced may be fissioned itself before
recovery-for this consumption there is no charge and, of course, no
fair price payment."°
This fair price for produced material may have a guaranteed
minimum for a period of time not to exceed seven years from the date
it is set 0 5 -under this authorization the Commission has set prices
currently guaranteed through 1963.1' This seven-year period has
been criticized as too short in light of the three or four-year period
required for construction of the reactor. The price has also been
assailed as too low to permit immediate profitable production of nuclear
power. Some had expected it to contribute a revenue approximately
equivalent to that of the power produced, at least in the case of a
breeder reactor.10
7
Whether an industry is using source material or special nuclear
material, the material is subject to a gradual depletion and contamina-
tion, at a stage far short of total consumption, after which it must
either be chemically reprocessed and rejuvenated or else replaced
entirely. Reprocessing, like original fabrication of the fuel element,
may be done by private persons if they obtain a license. However, the
Government now owns all reprocessing facilities and all but a few
fabricating facilities-again subjecting the user to the government
pricing scheme. The Commission is authorized to provide processing,
separating, fabricating or refining of nuclear material used by licensees
at a nondiscriminatory price which will provide reasonable compensa-
tion to the Government without discouraging the development of sources
of supply independent of the Commission." 8 In fact, the Commission
has said it will charge the same prices as may later be set by private
industry for these services, even though its cost may be lower." 9
By-Product Material
By-product materials, those radioactive materials prepared in the
course of production or utilization of special nuclear material," also
103. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 56, 68 STAT. 932, 42 U.S.C. § 2076 (Supp. III,
1955) ; see Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Amending the Atomic Energy Act of
1946, as Amended, and for Other Purposes, H.R. Ri. No. 2181, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.
16 (1954).
104. Hearings, supra note 65, at 86.
105. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 56, 68 STAT. 931, 42 U.S.C. § 2076 (Supp. III,
1955).
106. AEC News Release, No. 930, Nov. 18, 1956; AEC News Release, No. 590,
Jan. 10, 1955.
107. Hearings, supra note 84, at 255.
108. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 161(m), 68 STAT. 950, 42 U.S.C. § 2201(m)
(Supp. III, 1955) ; see Hearings, supra note 65, at 84-85.
109. Id. at 85.
110. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 11(c), 68 STAT. 923, 42 U.S.C. § 2014(c)
(Supp. III, 1955).
1957] GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF ATOMIC INDUSTRY 319
require either a general or special license for transfer or receipt of
possession or title, unless exempted therefrom by the Commission."'
Charges for such material supplied by the Commission may be waived
by the Commission," but if levied, must be nondiscriminatory and
must provide reasonable compensation to -the Government without
discouraging development of sources of supply independent of the
Government, and yet must be such as to encourage research and devel-
opment."3 Present Commission policy is to supply some users
(medical, agricultural and biological) of such materials at twenty per
cent of their established price."" Fission products produced in private
reactors are a species of by-product material and are created from
material that was government property before it fissioned. Neverthe-
less, the Government apparently intends to assert no title to such
fission products " 5 -it is still indeterminate whether this will provide
a source of revenue to the private owner through sale of a desired
commodity or a source of expense through costs of disposal as waste.
Consequences of Material Control
In an industry so affected by conditions of government ownership
and control, it may be anticipated that objections and difficulties will
arise. An evaluation of government ownership of special nuclear
material closely parallels that of government regulation of the atomic
area. The reason most commonly asserted is that government owner-
ship was imposed to assure the simplest possible mode of re-acquisition
in case of need for military purposes." 6  Special nuclear material
is made subject to recapture by the Government in case of war or
national emergency.-" This justification may now be dated. The
recent allocation by the President of 40,000 kilograms of U-235 for
peaceful purposes for the next several years was somewhat higher than
many persons expected, but it was generally felt that the years of
111. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 81, 68 STAT. 935, 42 U.S.C. § 2111 (Supp. III,
1955); see 21 Fmn. REG. 214 (1956) (10 C.F.R. pt. 30) (limited exemptions are made
in §§ 30.6-30.8).
112. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 81, 68 STAT. 935, 42 U.S.C. § 2111 (Supp. III,
1955).
113. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, §§ 81, 161(m), 68 STAT. 935, 950, 42 U.S.C.
§§2111, 2201(m) (Supp. III, 1955).
114. Hearings, supra note 65, at 94.
115. Address by W. Kenneth Davis, AEC Division of Reactor Development, Second
Power Reactor Fuel Processing Symposium, Idaho Falls, Idaho, Jan. 18-20, 1956.
116. See Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Amending the Atomic Energy Act of
1946, as Amended, and for Other Purposes, H.R. REP. No. 2181, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.
10 (1954) ; S. Rx,. No. 1211, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 14-15 (1946).
117. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, §§ 53(e) (4), 108, 68 STAT. 931, 939, 42 U.S.C.
§§2073(e) (4), 2138 (Supp. III, 1955).
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intensified production since about 1950 had enabled the accumulation
of a material supply more than adequate for military needs.
Another proposed justification for federal ownership has been
that it will give the Government an advantage in dealing with the
subject of international atomic controls." 8 This reasoning also may
be dated since it stems from a period when ownership of all the world's
fissionable material was expected to pass to an international organiza-
tion-a now remote possibility.
A reason of more current basis is that government ownership
may strengthen the constitutional basis for continued regulation of
the atomic field."' Regulating the use of government property is well
within the federal power. However, the constitutional basis for federal
ownership ought to be equally valid grounds for federal regulation
under private ownership. Psychologically, government ownership
probably makes industry more willing to accept regulation, as well as
providing a safety check which eases the minds of Congress when
broadening the rights of industry.
Suggestions have been made that ownership of such material
eventually should be permitted for private persons.120  However, very
little agitation for private ownership seems to come from those most
active in the field. The Commission has not taken any position as to
whether private ownership should be permitted.12' Government owner-
ship has the disadvantage that the reactor owner is tied closer to the
need for government approval of his continued operation and it pre-
cludes the growth of a free market in the material. The unwillingness
of some foreign countries to base their atomic programs on an un-
certain supply of such material undoubtedly underlies, at least in part,
their decisions to concentrate on natural uranium reactors. On the
other hand, the Government is making the material available on a lease
charge of four per cent of its value, 2' thereby saving industry the
need to invest to the extent of total value of the material were it to be
bought for private ownership.
The statute prescribes no length of time during which a material
license shall extend. However, the Commission's regulations indicate
that a material license shall be coextensive with the duration of a
118. 1 PANEL ON THE IMPACT OF THE PEACEFUL USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY,
PrAciwuL USES or ATomIC ENERGY 131 (Report to the Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy 1956).
119. Hearings, supra note 65, at 513.
120. See 1 PANEL ON THE IMPACT OF THE PEACEFUL USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY, op.
cit. supra note 118, at 13, 134.
121. Hearings Before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 84th Cong., 2d Sess.
393 (1956).
122. Id. at 86; Hearings, supra note 84, at 74.
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facilities license, in cases where the latter is also required.m Of even
more consequence is the assurance of a material supply while the
license is in effect. The Commission is authorized, but not required,
to make special nuclear material available for the period of the license.1 4
The total amount of special nuclear material to be made available for
private use is to be determined at least annually by the President 12 5 ._
for domestic use, as mentioned, this is currently 20,000 kilograms, an
amount which apparently is to cover activities for several years. The
first two construction permits issued contained allocations totalling
over 14,000 kilograms of U-235 for forty-year periods of operation. 2 '
A third major construction permit has allocated 4,000 kilograms for a
twenty-five-year period of operation.2 7 The Commission has indicated
that, so long as such material is available, it will make long term
commitments for the supply thereof, i.e., for the life of the facility
license, apparently setting aside at the time enough material out of
existing allocations to enable it to back up its promise. 28
"[The licensee] will, of course, need to have assurance at
the beginning that this material which the Government has to
own is going to be available to him as he needs it. So we propose
to set up allocations to each of the reactor owners and distribute
the material to them as needed." '9
If this is the procedure, then over ninety per cent of the current
20,000 kilogram domestic allocation has been earmarked for the lirst
three licensees; if it is not, then the licensees apparently have only a
paper allocation with no tangible assurance of material availability as
needed. Either way, the inference must be that the Commission ex-
pects each presidential allocation to represent a permanent contribution
of material to domestic availability, that is, until consumed. Never-
theless, the legal enforceability of such promises of material supply,
lacking legislative clarification, must rest with the courts. If the
Commission does not, or cannot, guarantee a supply of material for
periods of time sufficiently long to justify private investment in atomic
activities, private development may well be retarded. Facilities con-
123. 21 FMD. R.G. 359, 766 (1956) (10 C.F.R. §§ 50.60, 70.31(b)(1)); see
Hearings, supra note 121, at 86.
124. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 53(a), 68 STAT. 930, 42 U.S.C. §2073 (a)
(Supp. III, 1955).
125. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 41(b), 68 STAT. 928, 42 U.S.C. § 2061(b)
(Supp. III, 1955).
126. AEC News Release, No. 823, May 4, 1956.
127. Atomic Industrial Forum Memo, Aug. 1956, p. 11.
128. 21 Fir. Ri. 359, 766 (1956) (10 C.F.R. §§ 50.60, 70.31) ; AEC News Release,
No. 622, April 12, 1955.
129. Hearings, supra note 121, at 115.
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structed today may be obsolete within a few years; government reluct-
ance to continue supplying material to such facilities can be imagined
if no commitment exists to do so.
The Commission has used its power to waive costs for the use
of special nuclear material for certain projects adopted under the
Power Demonstration Reactor Program. This discrimination has
been the subject of considerable attack by some members of the Joint
Committee and by representatives of small business. Otherwise,
however, the Commission has sagely avoided criticism by imposing
uniform prices for everyone.'3 0 Uranium-235 was formerly priced
at twenty-five dollars per gram for lease and use in foreign research
reactors; '31 however, the United States now makes this fuel available
for foreign research and power uses at the identical prices charged
domestic nuclear uses.
131a
Domestic prices for U-235 only recently have been declassified .
32
The base charge varies slightly, according to the percentage of U-238
which is also present, but is roughly about seventeen dollars per gram
of U-235. The charge per gram of U-235 is largely independent of
the degree of enrichment due to the fact that partially enriched uranium
cannot be "bled" satisfactorily from the isotopic separation diffusion
process. Thus, enrichments of less than about 100 per cent are
normally achieved by re-diluting separated U-235 with natural uranium.
The prices to be paid by the Commission for the private produc-
tion of special nuclear material are to be uniform and fair, but this
is not to say that they must constitute just compensation for the
expense of production. Apparently, the privilege of private participa-
tion in this field precludes a claim of condemnation and the attendant
standard of reimbursement. The setting of government prices for
materials consumed and produced could have an economic effect on
nuclear power, i.e., a subsidy. 3 If, as appears likely, fuel consumption
costs will constitute only about ten per cent of the cost of generating
power from most reactors, the effect could not be gross except for
reactors specially designed to breed new special nuclear material and
then only if the prices were markedly rigged. However, the Com-
mission has elected not to encourage economic reliance on income
from government purchase of material and it purports to have set a
130. AEC News Release, No. 590, Jan. 10, 1955.
131. AEC News Release, No. 675, Aug. 8, 1955.
131a. AEC News Release, Nov. 18, 1956.
132. AEC News Release, Nov. 17, 1956; AEC News Release, No. 590, Jan. 10,
1955; Hearings, supra note 121, at 400.
133. See Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Amending the Atonic Energy Act
of 1946, as Amended, and for Other Purposes, H.R. REP. No. 2181, 83d Cong., 2d
Sess. 131 (1954) (minority).
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fair price for such produced material based according to its fuel value,
just as it charges for the consumption of fuel material."3 4 Only a
slightly inflated price may still be paid for some of the produced material
in view of its weapons value. However, fair prices during 1962-1963
have been disclosed recently as twelve dollars for plutonium and fifteen
dollars for U-233.'35 Thus, for similar compositions of special nuclear
material, the reasonable charge for consumption closely approximates
the fair price for production. This approach has been said to produce a
fair price about one-half that which some industry members had ex-
pected. "
One question of some interest is the disposition of the "fair price"
proceeds from such material production by a utility; the decision will
lie with the state regulatory agency. One possibility is that the proceeds
will be applied as a credit to reduce the cost of fuel. Another alternative
is that the proceeds, together with the cost of producing the material,
will be treated as a separate venture by the utility and thus separate
from rate considerations. Precedent is unclear as to which alternative
is more apt to be followed; the question is not critical in any event.
Accountability for nuclear fuel is a major concern of the private
user, since he must pay a lease charge of four per cent while he has it
plus a consumption charge for all that he consumes or loses. In this
connection, it is interesting to note that the nuclear material allotment
for the reactor owner will be given him as bulk material by the
Government and he remains the person financially responsible for the
material until it is returned to the Commission-unless other arrange-
ments are made with the Commission.3 7 Fabrication of the bulk fuel
into fuel elements suitable for use may be done for him either by the
Government or private industry. Either way, the fabrication process
is such that about forty to sixty per cent of the material may be con-
verted into scrap. That is, it will not appear in the finished fuel
elements. The disposition of this scrap is currently a matter of some
concern. Since the reactor owner cannot use it for fuel, he will not
want to continue paying four per cent lease charge on it; the fabricator
certainly has no use for it. Yet, because the scrap material will have
been alloyed or otherwise contaminated so as to be downgraded in
purity, the Government has no schedule for buying it back other than
134. See Hearings, supra note 84, at 74.
135. AEC News Release, No. 930, Nov. 18, 1956; AEC News Release, Nov. 17,
1956.
136. Hearings, supra note 84, at 249.
137. 21 FED. REG. 765, 766, 767 (1956) (10 C.F.R. J§ 70.22, 70.23(e), 70.31(b) (2),
70.43); Price, The AEC Licensing Program, ATomic ENrGY-A REmmsTic Ap-
PpAisAL 154, 158 (Atomic Industrial Forum Report 1955).
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by making a charge for downgrading which will cover the expense of
reprocessing it into fuel grade material again."3 8 One suggestion has
been that the Government instead set up a "bank" of such contaminated
material, on the assumption that someone will eventually want such
material at a future date. Thus, the reactor owner might be saved
at least part of the charge for total reprocessing. The entire problem
recurs every time fuel must be reprocessed and refabricated.
Another problem of accountability concerns the ascertainment of
weight and composition of special nuclear material as it changes hands,
i.e., from the Government to the fabricator, to the reactor owner, to
the reprocessor, to the fabricator and so on. One possibility is an assay-
umpiring scheme like that now used for private transfers of precious
metals such as gold and platinum. With material seven times as
valuable as platinum, twenty-one times as valuable as gold, account-
ability will require highly precise methods; a gram of special nuclear
material, having a value of approximately twenty-five dollars per gram,
is about the size of a BB shot used in a child's air rifle.
The initial requirement of a license for any activity involving
nuclear material involves an implicit requirement of some government
sanction for the proposed activity. Licensing of both special nuclear 139
and source materials 140 is to be decided with regard to the importance
of the proposed use to the common defense and security and to the
health and safety of the public. Furthermore, for licenses for special
nuclear material, in case the availability of material does not meet the
demand, the Commission is directed to prefer projects which, in its
opinion, will contribute the most to basic research, peacetime usage and
the nation's economic and military strength. 4 ' Discrimination from
the latter directive seems unlikely to materialize at present in view of
the apparent adequacy of material supply. Nevertheless, no business is
likely to savor the necessity for governmental approval of its projects.
PRODUCTION AND UTILIZATION FACILITIES
Commission sanction is required for many activities in the atomic
field in addition to licenses for possession of nuclear materials and
permits for access to information. Private ownership of facilities for
the production or utilization of special nuclear material is permitted
138. Hearings, supra note 121, at 86.
139. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 53(b), 68 STAT. 930, 42 U.S.C. § 2073(b)
(Supp. III, 1955).
140. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 63(b), 68 STAT. 933, 42 U.S.C. § 2093(b)
(Supp. III, 1955).
141. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 53(f), 68 STAT. 931, 42 U.S.C. § 2073(f)
(Supp. III, 1955).
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under the act. However, except for the smaller research facilities, "it
shall be unlawful . . . for any person within the United States to
transfer or receive in interstate commerce, manufacture, produce, trans-
fer, acquire, possess, import, or export any utilization or production
facility except under and in accordance with a license issued by the
Commission. . . . " Individual licenses are also required for per-
sons who are to operate such facilities.'3
Production and utilization facilities are defined in the act to mean
any equipment or device determined by rule of the Commission to be
capable of producing, or making use of, special nuclear material in such
quantity as to be of significance to the common defense and security or
in such manner as to affect the health and safety of the public. 44 The
utilization facility definition further encompasses similar use of any
form of energy released in the course of nuclear fission or transforma-
tion. Although these determinations could be very broad, they have,
in fact, been quite narrow. The regulations define production facility to
mean:
"(1) any nuclear reactor designed or used primarily for the
formation of plutonium or uranium-233; or
(2) any facility designed or used for the separation of the
isotopes of uranium or the isotopes of plutonium, except laboratory
scale facilities designed or used for experimental or analytical
purposes only; or
(3) any facility designed or used for the processing of irradi-
ated materials containing special nuclear material, except labora-
tory scale facilities designed or used for experimental or analytical
purposes only." 145
Utilization facility means "any nuclear reactor other than one
designed or used primarily for the formation of plutonium or uranium-
233." 146 Important component parts of such facilities may likewise
be designated by the Commission as such facilities; no such designation
has yet been made.
Thus, licensed facilities are those engaged quite directly in the
operation of nuclear reactors for power, namely, the reactor itself and
142. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 101, 68 STAT. 936, 42 U.S.C. § 2131 (Supp. III,
1955). See also Atomic Energy Act of 1954, §§ 41(a), 103, 104, 109, 68 STAT'. 928, 936,
939, 42 U.S.C. § 2061(a), 2133, 2134, 2139 (Supp. III, 1955) ; 21 FF.D. REG. 356 (1956)
(10 C.F.R. pt. 50).
143. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, §§ 11(m), 107; 68 STAT. 923, 939, 42 U.S.C.
88 2014, 2137 (Supp. III, 1955) ; see 21 FtD. ZG. 6 (1956) (10 C.F.R. pt. 55).
144. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, §§ 11(p), (v), 68 STAr. 923, 924, 42 U.S.C.
88 2014(p), (v) (Supp. III, 1955).
145. 21 FreD. RE.o. 356 (1956) (10 C.F.t. § 50.2(a)).
146. Ibid. (10 C.F.R. § 502(b)).
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the facilities used to supply or process its fuel. The first licensees will
be the reactor owners. As the reactors near completion, they will re-
quire fuel containing the energy-producing special nuclear material;
the bulk material supplied by the Government must be fabricated into
fuel elements for heterogeneous reactors or put into the appropriate
liquid phase for homogeneous reactors. While the act permits the
Government to perform this function for the reactor owner, 147 it is
hoped and expected that private industry will also participate. 4 '
Later, as fuel materials are partially burned and contaminated beyond
the point of continued use, they must be reprocessed and returned to
fuel grade purity. This activity may likewise be done by the Govern-
ment ... but with expectation that private industry will eventually
take over."' Following such reprocessing, fabrication may again be
necessary if the fuel is returned to the reactor.
For reasons attributed to the absence of health and security
problems, one of these facilities vital in the fuel cycle of atomic power
has been left unlicensed-this is the fabrication facility.' The de-
sirability of keeping facility licensing to a minimum seems much en-
couraged by the Commission's narrow definitions. But one somewhat
peculiar problem exists for the activity not involving a licensed facility:
unless the fabrication facility operates under a research and develop-
ment arrangement with the Commission, which is highly unlikely, the
act would not seem to authorize it to have a special nuclear material
license without an underlying facility license.'-5 In spite of the ap-
parently exclusive wording of the act concerning eligibility for a
special nuclear material license, some leeway may be implied in the
Joint Committee Report, which says that any facility which is not
determined to be a production or utilization facility "is exempt from
licensing as a facility, though the owner must still have a license for
any special nuclear material involved." '1 At any rate, the Commission
147. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 161 (m), 68 STAT. 950, 42 U.S.C. § 2201 (m)
(Supp. III, 1955).
148. Hearings, supra note 121, at 80, 83, 84.
149. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 161 (m), 68 STAT. 950, 42 U.S.C. § 2201 (m)
(Supp. III, 1955) ; see AEC News Release, No. 760, Jan. 13, 1956; AEC News Release
No. 759, Jan. 17, 1956; AEC News Release, No. 753, Jan. 5, 1956.
150. Hearings Before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 84th Cong., 1st Sess.
74-75 (1955) ; Spector, Chemical Processing, ATomIc ENERGY-TnE NEv INDUSTRIAL
FRONTIER 149 (Atomic Industrial Forum Report 1955).
151. Hearings, supra note 121, at 100.
152. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 53(a), 68 STAT. 930, 42 U.S.C. § 2073(a)
(Supp. III, 1955).
153. Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Amending the Atomic Energy Act of
1946, as Amended, and for Other Purposes, H.R. REP. No. 2181, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.
12 (1954).
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requires a material license for the fabricator and health and safety
measures will be contained therein. 5 4
Another quirk in the act is that facilities are defined according to
potential use, not what they are in fact used for. Thus, any facilities
capable of reprocessing nuclear material might require a license irrespec-
tive of their actual use. The regulations, however, embody the obvious
intent of the law and apply only to facilities designed or used for
production or utilization purposes.
Applicants for a license to construct or modify production or
utilization facilities are first granted construction permits."" Unless
the modification or construction is completed within set time limits, the
permit expires and all rights thereunder are forfeited-except where,
for good cause shown, the Commission allows an extension. Some
circumstances justifying extensions are set out in the regulations.
15
Upon completion of construction, if the facility is not to operate in
conformity with the application, the provisions of the act or the rules
or regulations of the Commission (which are subject to change), or
if good cause were shown the Commission why the granting of a license
would not be in accordance with the provisions of the act, then the
Commission still may deny the license, notwithstanding the expenditures
of the applicant and without remuneration to him.
The act divides all licensed facilities into two classes-"research
and development" and "commercial." All reactors thus far constructed
or proposed fall in the former category. Research and development
licenses are to be given preferentially to those projects which the
Commission expects to lead to major advances in industrial or com-
mercial utilization of atomic energy.157  However, the Commission
will grant such licenses even to duplicate facilities so long as no special
nuclear material shortage exists. 58 Commercial facility licenses are
available on a nonexclusive basis but only after the Commission has
made a finding of "practical value" for the type of facility involved
and has found that the specific proposed activity will serve a useful
purpose proportionate to the quantity of source or special nuclear
material to be utilized. 59 Practical value means competitive in both the
154. Hearings, supra note 121, at 100.
155. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 185, 68 STAT. 955, 42 U.S.C. § 2235 (Supp.
III, 1955).
156. 21 FtD. R.o. 359 (1956) (10 C.F.R. § 50.55(b)).
157. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 104(b), 68 STAT. 937, 42 U.S.C. § 2134(b)
(Supp. III, 1955).
158. Hearings, supra note 121, at 107.
159. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, §§ 102, 103(b), 68 STAT. 936, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2132,
2133(b) (Supp. III, 1955).
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technical and economic sense; '60 no facility has yet qualified for such
a finding. Preferences for commercial licenses go to high cost power
areas and to public or cooperative bodies. 1 The preference is likely
to have little effect, however, since it would seemingly apply only in
case of material shortage (which is not the present situation) or in
case of competition for serving the same area (which has probably
already been settled).
Although no assurance is given that a facility licensed for research
and development purposes may later obtain a commercial license if it
demonstrates practical value, this is clearly the intent of the act since
the regulation and terms of the research license are to be made com-
patible with regulation and terms which would apply to that class of
facility under a commercial license. 62 However, the conversion from
a research to commercial license apparently will take place only at the
time for renewal of the former, not before 0---and it would seem that
such a conversion must take into account the preferences described in
granting of commercial licenses.
In granting facility licenses, the Commission is authorized to
group together classes of facilities, define the activities permitted by each
class, and designate the amount of special nuclear material available
to each facility.' 4 It is obvious that either a material or facility license
may be valueless unless there is a concurrent license of the other type.
The Commission has used that section of the act permitting it to
combine several activities of one person within a single license.'
Under the regulations, the Commission may, upon request, incorporate
provisions into the facility license designating the quantities of special
nuclear material to be made available for the facility.' Such an
allocation necessarily depends upon material availability 16 7 and later
may be reduced by the Commission if it regards the amount as ex-
cessive."
160. Hearings, supra note 121, at 394; 2 PANl ON 'rx ImPAcT OF TH4 P-ACEPUL
USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY, op. cit. supra note 118, at 645.
161. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 182(c), 68 ST'AT. 954, 42 U.S.C. § 2233(c)
(Supp. III, 1955).
162. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 104(b), 68 STAT. 937, 42 U.S.C. § 2134(b)
(Supp. III, 1955).
163. 21 FED. REG. 354 (1956) (10 C.F.R. §50.24).
164. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 106, 68 STAT. 938, 42 U.S.C. § 2136 (Supp. III,
1955).
165. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 161(h), 68 STAT. 949, 42 U.S.C. § 2201(h)
(Supp. III, 1955) ; See 21 Fxn. R-o. 359 (1956) (10 C.F.R. § 50.52); Hearings, supra
note 121, at 128.
166. 21 FRm. RZiG. 359, 766 (1956) (10 C.F.R. §§ 50.60, 70.31(b) (1)); see text at
note 128 supra.
167. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, §§ 41(b), 53(f), 68 STAT. 928, 931, 42 U.S.C.
§§2061(b), 2073(f) (Supp. III, 1955).
168. 21 FED. R.a. 767 (1956) (10 C.F.R. § 70.38(a)).
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Although commercial facility licenses have a statutory maximum
duration of forty years, with the possibility of renewal at the expiration
of such period,'69 no other licenses have any statutory defined maximum
or minimum period. The regulations provide, however, that subject to
a forty-year maximum for any facility license, the period of the license
may be made either that which is asked by the licensee or the useful
life of the facility, whichever is shorter. 7 0
LICENSING IN GENERAL
Under such extensive licensing, it is not difficult to envisage situ-
ations of strain between industry and Government in the coming years.
The requirement of a license could initially impose the opinion of the
Commission upon that of industry as to the merits of the proposed
venture, as well as constituting a perhaps unwelcome inquiry into the
business activities of the applicant.' For utilities, such regulation
would be in addition to that already imposed by state regulatory bodies.
It is doubtful that the Commission is currently using licensing to
restrict entry into the field. Although there is evidence of past instances
where the Commission itself has not desired to explore certain avenues
of development and yet has withheld license from members of private
industry who were willing and anxious to do so at their own expense,
it is said that no facility license has yet been denied nor is licensing
serving to delay proposed projects. When an industry proposal is
rejected on the merits for the first time, criticism of the power will
likely become more pronounced.
Even after obtaining a material or facility license, many problems
remain. No license may be transferred without commission ap-
proval.t 3 This requires that the Commission be a party to arrange-
ments for financing the reactor; specific provision is made for com-
mission approval of a lienor in advance of reactor construction' 7 4
Some private opinion is that the latter provision may be eliminated. 1 5
169. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 103(c), 68 STAT. 937, 42 U.S.C. § 2134(c)
(Supp. III, 1955).
170. 21 Fie. Rzo. 359 (1956) (10 C.F.R. § 50.51).
171. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 182(a), 68 STAT. 953, 42 U.S.C. § 2232(a)
(Supp. III, 1955).
172. Hearings Before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 84th Cong., 2d Sess.
105, 106, 122, 443 (1956).
173. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, §§ 53 (e) (3), 183(c), 184, 68 STAT. 931, 954,
42 U.S.C. §§ 2073(e) (3), 2233(c), 2234 (Supp. III, 1955).
174. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 184, 68 STAT. 954, 42 U.S.C. § 2234 (Supp. III,
1955).
175. Molesworth, Ramifications of Atomic Energy in the Field of Finance, ATomIc
ENERGY-THE NEW INDusTRL&x FRONTIER 248, 253-54 (Atomic Industrial Forum Re-
port 1955).
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Similarly, any reorganization altering control of a licensee would seem
to require commission approval.
In the event of national emergency or war, the Commission may
suspend any license; during the same period the Commission may
recapture any special nuclear material or order the operation of the
facility, although damages from these latter measures require just
compensation.' In fact, the Commission may condemn and acquire
a production facility at any time in the interest of the common defense
and security if just compensation is made.'
All licenses remain subject to amendment, revision or modification
either by amendments to the act 178 or to rules and regulations issued
thereunder.' 9 Conditions for revocation of licenses are a matter of
concern, since they include the making of material false statements in
the application, the existence of facts later revealed which would justify
the Commission in not issuing an original license, violation of terms or
provisions of the act or any regulation of the Commission or some-
times for violations of antitrust laws.' Although the act requires
that section 9(b) of the Administrative Procedure Act 181 be followed
in case of license revocation,182 which entitles the licensee to notice
and a chance to correct the violation, the Commission in certain in-
stances may recapture all special nuclear material prior to any procedure
thereunder.'3 In some cases, the Commission may operate the facility
before or after any such procedures, 8 4 but paying just compensation
for doing so.' 5 The Commission may also recall by-product material
under conditions justifying revocation of the license.' Under current
176. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, §§ 108, 171, 68 STAT. 939, 952, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2138, 2221 (Supp. III, 1955).:
177. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, §§ 43, 171, 68 STAT. 929, 952, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2063, 2221 (Supp. III, 1955).
178. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 187, 68 STAT. 955, 42 U.S.C. § 2237 (Supp. III,
1955).
179. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 183(d), 68 STAT. 954, 42 U.S.C. § 2233(d)
(Supp. III, 1955).
180. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 186, 68 STAT. 955, 42 U.S.C. § 2236 (Supp. III,
1955) ; see 21 FtD. R,. 217, 360, 767 (1956) (10 C.F.R. §§ 30.51, 50.100, 70.61). Access
permits are likewise revocable on essentially the same grounds. Id. at 812 (10 C.F.R.
§ 25.29). See also Atomic Energy Act of 1954, §§ 81, 105, 68 STAT. 935, 938, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2111, 2135 (Supp. III, 1955).
181. 60 STAT. 242 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1008(b) (1952).
182. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 186(b), 68 STAT. 955, 42 U.S.C. § 2236(b)
(Supp. III, 1955).
183. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 186(c), 68 STAT. 955, 42 U.S.C. § 2236(c)
(Supp. iII, 1955).
184. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 188, 68 STAT. 955, 42 U.S.C. § 2238 (Supp. III,
1955).
185. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 186(c), 68 STAT. 955, 42 U.S.C. § 2236(c)
(Supp. III, 1955).
186. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 81, 68 STAT. 935, 42 U.S.C. § 2111 (Supp. III,
1955).
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regulations, the Commission has provided that any action to suspend,
modify or revoke any license or construction permit will be preceded by
notice of the deficiency and a formal hearing-except that in some
instances the action may be made effective without notice and prior to
a hearing.1
8 7
Amendment, modification, suspension and revocation of licenses
present a real source of concern.'8 8 Most of these powers over the
licensee provide no compensation to him for interrupting his business.
Since the licensee is granted notice and a hearing, with a chance for
subsequent judicial review of commission action,8 9 he seems adequately
protected procedurally. However, the substantive bases for action
seem rather harsh. Revocation could be limited, instead, to cases
where the making of a false material representation led to granting of
a license that would otherwise have been withheld. Suspension nor-
mally should be adequate sanction to assure compliance by the licensee
with the act and the regulations. In extreme cases, a prescribed period
of suspension could justify revocation. Aside from these sanctions,
any requirement by the Commission that a licensee discontinue his
activity should be accompanied by condemnation and just compensation.
A change in opinion of the Commission as to the merits of an activity,
which apparently could sustain revocation under the present law, should
not be actionable at all.
Another concern lies in the fact that the construction permit is
no guaranty of a subsequent license; one industry has already given
this uncertainty as grounds for abandoning a proposed reactor
project. 9° The act gives no suggestion as to why the application need
be scrutinized so carefully for a second time after investment by the
applicant. Suggestion has been made that this is intended only to
assure that the facility will operate safely before a license is given; ..
the recent issuance of the first four construction permits was on such
condition."" If this is the reason, then the act expressly should limit
denial to such grounds; even so, where the Commission has taken
part in prescribing the original design and safety features of the
facility, it would not seem unreasonable that the applicant be reim-
bursed for his expenditures if the Commission later decides that the
187. 21 FE. REG. 217, 767 (1956) (10 C.F.R. §§ 30.51, 70.61); see id. at 805
(10 C.F.R. pt. 2, subpt. B).
188. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 150, at 549, 596.
189. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 189, 68 STAT. 955, 42 U.S.C. § 2239 (Supp. III,
1955).
190. Atomic Industrial Forum Memo, April 1956, pp. 16-17.
191. MARKS & TRowBRu , FAmrvouc POR ATOMIC INDUSTRY 76 (1955).
192. See AEC News Release, No. 829, May 15, 1956; AEC News Release, No. 823,
May 4, 1956; Atomic Industrial Forum Memo, Aug. 1956, p. 11.
332 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 105
facility cannot be licensed or that it requires extensive modification.
The Joint Committee Report indicates that a license should follow the
permit virtually as a matter of course and this concept should be
incorporated into the act.'93
Under the indefinite duration of licenses provided by the act,
some concern was expressed that long enough periods of operation to
justify investment might not be permitted. However, the regulations
providing for a period sufficient to cover the life of the facility ease this
concern. Similarly, the Commission's willingness to make special
nuclear material licenses coincide with the facility license should remove
remaining problems of duration.
One remaining requirement imposed on a licensee is the necessity
to supply reports and records to the Commission and to submit to
inspection." In particular, commercial licensees must agree to disclose
technical information concerning their operations when so asked by the
Commission."' Since many licensees may have legitimate trade
secrets which would be disclosed by these measures, adequate protec-
tion should be provided to assure that these confidential matters will
not become disclosed to the public. This protection should be broader
than the general proscription of unauthorized use of confidential in-
formation acquired by government personnel. 9 For the technical
information disclosed by the commercial licensee, the act merely re-
stricts its use to furthering the common defense and security and
protecting the health and safety of the public. It is the feeling of many
persons that continued need for licensing is in conflict with the principle
of private enterprise, even though no one yet seems to have been
hurt by such requirements. 17  However, it should be obvious that
industry cannot be left wholly free in this field of endeavor. The
country's health, safety and security must be respected by industry.
It may be essential to the country's security that certain type facilities
and certain grades of nuclear materials should not be sent to particular
countries abroad. The inherent dangers of many atomic activities
demand that precautions be taken during domestic operation to protect
both workers and the surrounding populace. Ability to respond
193. Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Amending the Atomic Energy Act of
1946, as Amended, and for Other Purposes, H. R. REP. No. 2181, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.
28 (1954).
194. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 16 1(p), 68 STAT. 950, 42 U.S.C. § 2201(p)
(Supp. III, 1955).
195. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 103(b), 68 STAr. 936, 42 U.S.C. § 2133(b)
(Supp. III, 1955).
196. 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1952).
197. See 1 PANEL ON THE IMPACT OV THE PEACEPUL USES or ATOMIC ENERGY,
PEACEFUL USES op ATOMIC ENERGY 13, 132, 134 (Report to the Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy 1956).
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financially to damage caused by accident should be a prerequisite to
any undertaking. Disposal of unwanted radioactive wastes must be
regulated with care.
Licensing is certainly one logical way to assure that these interests
are protected. The only practical alternative would appear to be a
system of regulation coupled with a requirement that all activities be
reported to the regulatory agency. While this would impose no need
for direct sanction by the Government of a proposed activity, the under-
lying practical requirement for such approval would be much the same.
However, under either approach, some simplification of the present
coverage of government control might be proposed.
The requirement of license for dealings in source material seems
one that could readily be dispensed with. This material has little
security importance since it is available in many countries and there
is virtually an international market for it at present. In fact, the
United States has quoted prices at which it will sell such material.
Furthermore, until placed in a utilization facility, it poses no unusual
health or safety problems. Removal of licensing might aid substantially
in providing a competitive market for supply of refined source material,
thus enabling a price determined independently of the Government.
Eventually, the Government could satisfy its own needs from a totally
private market. Meanwhile, so long as ore producers insist on a
government-guaranteed minimum for their product and private
industry shows little or no inclination to compete in the milling and
refining of source material for sale to industry, there can be little
meaningful criticism of the terms, availability or prices which the
Government elects to put upon source material that it provides
industry.
By-product materials require regulation primarily because of the
health and safety problems which attend high concentrations of
radioactivity emitted by them. There is no reason why possession of
such materials should require a license for radioactivities below a
certain intensity-in fact, the Commission has recognized this fact by
granting a general license for their possession in limited quantity.
9 8
For more concentrated radioactivities, safety regulation becomes highly
important and the requirement of a license is probably no more burden-
some than a requirement of strict adherence to safety regulations.
For special nuclear material and for production and utilization
facilities, the considerations of health, safety and security already
mentioned are most critical. By requiring a license, the onus is put
198. 21 F:D. lb . 215 (1956) (10 C.F.R. § 30.21).
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on each person to show the Commission that his activity will not
jeopardize public interests. In this manner it is probably simpler for
the Commission to administer essentially the same standards which
would be required anyhow under the guise of regulation.
PATENTS
One of the most controversial aspects of the atomic field is that
concerning patents. The act deals with patents in two general ways:
by putting limitations on the acquisition of patents and by dictating
the usage of patents once acquired.
Limitations on Patent Acquisition
The act precludes patentability for inventions only to the extent
that they involve the utilization of special nuclear material or atomic
energy in atomic weapons.' 99 Just compensation is to be paid for the
revocation of such patents if granted prior to the act, but no such
compensation is provided for the denial of right to such future patents,
other than an optional award.2"
Any invention or discovery made concerning the production or
utilization of special nuclear material or atomic energy must be reported
either to the Commission or by patent application within ninety days
following completion of such invention or realization of its nature,
whichever event occurs later.20 1 Furthermore,
"any invention or discovery, useful in the production or utilization
of special nuclear material or atomic energy, made or conceived
under any contract, subcontract, arrangement, or other relation-
ship with the Commission, regardless of whether the contract or
arrangement involved the expenditure of funds by the Commission,
shall be deemed to have been made or conceived by the Commis-
sion, except that the Commission may waive its claim to any such
invention or discovery if made or conceived by any person . . .
under such . . . circumstances as the Commission may deem
appropriate." 202
199. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, §151(a), (b), 68 STAT. 943, 42 U.S.C.
§§2181(a), (b) (Supp. III, 1955).
200. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, §§ 157(b), (c), 68 STAT. 947, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2187(b), (c) (Supp. III, 1955) ; see 10 C.F.R. pt. 80 (Supp. 1955). See also Boskey,
Some Patent Aspects of Atomic Power Development, 21 LAW & CONTZMP. PROB. 113,
118-19 (1956).
201. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 151(c), 68 STAar. 943, 42 U.S.C. § 2181(c)
(Supp. III, 1955).
202. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 152, 68 STAT. 944, 42 U.S.C. § 2182 (Supp. III,
1955). See also Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 159, 68 STAT. 948, 42 U.S.C. § 2189
(Supp. III, 1955).
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Any dispute between the true inventor and the Commission as to proper
ownership of the invention and patent is resolved by appeal first to
the Board of Patent Interferences and thereafter to the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals.
Although such a provision is extremely broad, potentially en-
compassing virtually every invention in the atomic arena, the Com-
mission has waived its ownership rights where the arrangement is
only an access permit (including access to either secret or confidential
restricted data), or a purchase of irradiation services or radioisotopes,
or the use of materials made generally available by the Commission. °s
It has also stated that it does not regard a mere license as an arrange-
ment within the meaning of the statute.20 4  For those persons contract-
ing with it, however, the Commission is continuing to use the relatively
stringent patent clauses which it adopted under the 1946 Act.2"5
Limitations on Patentees' Rights
The act also limits the customary rights associated with privately-
owned patents. If an invention or discovery is of primary importance
in the production or utilization of special nuclear material or atomic
energy, and licensing of the invention is of primary importance in
effectuating the policies of the act, the Commission may, after a hear-
ing, declare it to be affected with the public interest. Thereafter, the
Commission is licensed to use the invention and it may also grant
licenses to private persons where use of the invention is of primary
importance to such persons in activities authorized by the act.2 6 The
Commission also has the power to compel licensing of such inventions
under essentially identical standards, including a hearing, without a
declaration of public interest, upon application initiated by certain
prospective licensees.20 7  Under either approach, the license shall be
nonexclusive and revocable. This compulsory licensing must provide
a reasonable royalty to the patentee, as determined by the Commission
in absence of agreement between the parties.208  But no court has
203. 21 FED. RIG. 811 (1956) (10 C.F.R. § 25.23(b) ) ; Hearings, supra note 172, at
401; AEC News Release, No. 892, Sept. 18, 1956; 1 PANEL ON THE IMPACT OF THE
PEACEFUL USES OF ATomic EmmGY, op. cit. supra note 197, at 24; 2 id. at 673.
204. 21 FED. REG. 1414 (1956) (10 C.F.R. § 8.1). See also 100 CONG. Ric. 13783,
14344 (1954).
205. Hearings Before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 84th Cong., 1st Sess.
193 (1955) ; see text at note 224 infra.
206. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, §§ 153(a), (b), 68 STAT. 945, 42 U.S.C.
§§2183(a), (b) (Supp. III, 1955); see 21 FED. REG. 804, 606 (1956) (10 C.F.R.
pts. 2, 81).
207. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, §§ 153(c)-(f), 68 STAT. 945, 42 U.S.C. §§2183
(c)-(f) (Supp. III, 1955) ; see 21 FED. REG. 804, 606 (1956) (10 C.F.R. pts. 2, 81).
208. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, §§ 153(g), 157(b), (c), 68 STAT. 945, 947, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2183(g), 2187(b), (c) (Supp. III, 1955); 10 C.F.R. pt. 80 (Supp. 1955).
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jurisdiction to enjoin authorized use of the invention by the licensee,
even for failure to pay the royalty fee. 09 As the act now reads, these
compulsory licensing requirements last over the entire seventeen-year
life of any patent which is issued on an application filed before
September 1, 1959.210
As a final intrusion on the patentee's rights, restricted data based
on patent applications may be communicated to other nations by the
Commission, but such action requires just compensation to the owner
of the application."' Traditionally, patent applications are held in
confidence so as to prevent gratuitous disclosure of the inventor's work
should a patent be denied.
Background of the Patent Sections: Compulsory Licensing
These extreme inroads on customary patent law represent two
schools of thought as to the best method of preventing private patents
from obstructing future development of atomic energy in the public's
best interest. The Senate preferred to control patents by the compul-
sory licensing scheme; this measure was appreciably debated before
passage. The House added the limitations giving the Commission
proprietary rights to inventions; these measures did not appear in the
bill as reported out by the Joint Committee and they were passed
with little public comment. It was expected at the time of the act's
passage that the patent provisions would be among the first to merit
renewed consideration. Much of the expected criticism has failed to
materialize publicly however, and one conclusion has been that the
provisions are satisfactory for the time being.21
Compulsory licensing has been often advocated, and as often re-
jected, in the traditional field of patents. A patent gives a temporary
(seventeen-year) exclusive right to an invention, a privilege which
obviously deprives the public of nothing which it previously possessed
(except the academic right to invent and use the underlying invention).
The prevailing opinion has been that if the inventor chooses not to
license his patent during this period, then recognition of his property
rights should preclude requiring him to do so. This intrusion into
his rights was done for the first time by the 1946 Act and was carried
209. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 154, 68 STAT. 946, 42 U.S.C. § 2184 (Supp. III,
1955).
210. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 153(h), 68 STAT. 946, 42 U.S.C. § 2183(h)
(Supp. III, 1955).
211. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 173, 68 STAT. 953, 42 U.S.C. § 2223 (Supp. III,
1955).
212. 1 PANEL ON THE IMPACT OF THE PEACEFUL USES OF AToMIc ENERGY, op. Cit.
mipra note 197, at 16, 147.
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over into the 1954 Act. The compulsory license section has had some
doubt cast upon its constitutionality, the Constitution saying that:
"The Congress shall have power . . . to promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Dis-
coveries." 213 The argument has been made that compulsory licensing
is short of an "exclusive right." The Copyright Law, stemming from
the same clause, also has some provisions for compulsory licensing
which have never been declared unconstitutional. 14 Since the con-
stitutional clause empowers, rather than requires, Congress to grant
exclusive rights, the objections do not seem to propose a serious
challenge to constitutionality.
The case for compulsory licensing is largely that no one should be
able to substantially hamper the progress of others by patenting a
crucial invention. In the present state of the art, it is most doubtful that
any fundamental inventions would be patented which could not be
circumvented by others in the field.215
Compulsory licensing may somewhat weaken the patentee's bar-
gaining position in attempting to voluntarily license his patent on
terms most advantageous to him, since such licensing will be at a
royalty determined or influenced by the Commission. Upon reflection,
however, it will be remembered that a similar power in the 1946 Act
was never used by the Commission. As preserved in the 1954 Act,
the power is ringed with statutory standards which assure its use only
in extreme situations-the power has not been used or solicited to
date.216 The Commission openly views it as a reserve power, at most.
The power expires as to patents for which application is made after
September 1, 1959; if no attempt is made to extend the life of this
power, the whole controversy may prove to be a tempest in a teapot.
In the meantime, many patent applications probably will be delayed
until inventions are further perfected than is ordinarily the case. Some
agitation exists for extension of the power,217 however; if this persists,
the teapot may again come to a boil.
The act requires reporting of inventions for which patents are
not solicited, but the ninety-day time limit is determined with regard
to completion, not conception, of the invention-completion denotes
213. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8.
214. 17 U.S.C. § 1(e) (1952).
215. Hearings, supra note 172, at 435.
216. 2 PANEL ON THE IMPACT OP THE PEACErUL UsEs ov AToMIc ENERGY, op. cit.
supra note 197, at 673.
217. Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Amending the Atomic Energy Act of
1946, as Amended, and for Other Purposes, H.R. REP. No. 2181, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.
127 (1954) (minority) ; Hearings, supra note 172, at 217, 278.
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a date sufficiently flexible to largely reduce the effect of the require-
ment, without much concurrent detriment to subsequent patentability.
Willful failure to comply with this section, if established, could lead
to a fine and perhaps might jeopardize continuance of a license held
from the Commission.21 Since no mention is made in the act that
failure to report an invention should forfeit patent rights, there seems
no justification for such a result. Such reporting should be accompanied
by an assurance that legitimate trade secrets will not be unfairly dis-
closed.
The Direction of Future Patent Control
Although compulsory licensing may raise the most smoke, it is
the limitations on invention ownership and patent acquisition which
create the most fire. The preclusion of patents in the atomic weapons
field is understandable. The government monopoly of this area ob-
viously would leave the patentee little chance to exploit his invention
anyhow. It has been suggested that an optional award from the
Commission may be more favorable than a royalty from government
use of a patent-because the latter would have to be collected through
the Court of Claims.21 Since a similar ban existed in the 1946 Act,
the provision for just compensation for revoked patents is now of
little or no concern. It might seem more fair if the award potentially
available for cases of patent denial on future weapon inventions were
assured rather than left optional.
The main objection to patent limitations may be expected, in fact
has been manifested, from that section of the act which attributes
conception of the invention to the Commission if it has been made
under any arrangement with the Commission. The fact that the Com-
mission may assert ownership under conditions which would give it
no such right under general or contract law, plus the absence of com-
pensation to the true inventor when it does so, has raised questions of
constitutionality. Nothing in the Constitution seems to require that
the patent go to the true inventor, although this has always been the
patent statute requirement. Copyright, stemming from the same con-
stitutional clause, may go either to the author or the proprietor of
protectable works. However, confiscation of the invention by the
Commission in cases of arrangements in existence on the date of the
1954 Act, with no provision for just compensation, suggests a taking
of property without just compensation. No comparable argument
218. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 186(a), 68 STAT. 955, 42 U.S.C. § 2236(a)
(Supp. III, 1955).
219. Boskey, supra note 200, at 117.
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would apply to arrangements entered into after passage of the act,
since industry thereafter had warning of the consequences. In this
vein, the question has arisen whether a pre-1954 contract with the
Commission which reserved lesser rights for the Commission would
be a waiver of rights under the 1954 act; in any event, the question is
mooted by a Commission waiver in such cases of any extra rights it
might have under the 1954 Act.220
The act does not specify whether the terms "invention or discovery"
as used in the sections concerning reporting and commission owner-
ship refer to patentable invention or discovery or merely to significant
improvements in the art. If only the former is intended, the atomic
field may become ringed with trade secrets and "know-how" instead
of patented inventions, thereby leading to secrecy and indefinite
monopoly.
The practical consequences of this section, in light of the network
of control exercised over the entire field by the Commission, could be
that any invention or patent thereon in the atomic field belongs to the
Commission unless it elects to waive its rights. It appears not unlikely
that companies will report test case inventions to see the Commission's
reactions before they decide whether their subsequent research should
produce inventions or trade secrets. Some inference as to the Com-
mission's interpretation of the potential scope of its rights may be drawn
from its waiver of rights and its determination that licenses are not
arrangements within the statutory intent. Even these exceptions do
not apply where the least additional services or consultation may be
rendered by the Commission. An especially vexing part of the section
is the uncertainty involved for any given invention. 22 Any clearly
defined and unambiguous delineation of the Commission's rights would
at least let industry know where it stands and provide a firm footing
for a discussion as to the merits.
The Commission has stated that it lacks the experience to make
any further general declaration of policy as to when waivers will or
will not be made. In light of the absence of statutory standards for
waiver, the Commission's reticence is understandable. Since the act
creates the ambiguity, clarification must begin with it.22
One further objection to this limitation of patenting by persons
having a relationship with the Commission is that an area is thus
restricted for American inventors without concurrent restriction of
foreign inventors. A foreign inventor will have no relationship with
220. Hearings, supra note 205, at 193.
221. Hearings, supra note 772, at 284; 1 PANEL ON THE IMPACT OF THE PEACmFUL
Usas OF ATomic ENmGY, op. cit. supra note 197, at 16, 147.
222. Hearings, supra note 172, at 422, 433.
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the Commission; thus, he may get a patent on the same invention for
which a patent could be denied an American inventor, who would
likely have some arrangement with the Commission." 3
In addition to patent limitations set by the act, the patent rights
of private industry operating under contract with the Commission are
generally defined by contract.
"In contracts primarily for research or development or for
the operation of a facility, the patent provision provides for a
determination by the Commission of the right in and to any
inventions. Such a clause is referred to as a type A patent
provision.
"In instances where the work under a contract pertains in-
directly to basic research and development and relates to a general
field of activity of the contractor, the retention of a nonexclusive
license by the contractor in fields other than the production of
special nuclear materials or atomic energy is provided. for under
what is referred to as the type B patent provision.
"Where the work to be performed pertains only incidentally
to research and development in which the Commission is interested
and relates to a field in which the contractor has an established
industrial and patent position, a type C clause is used. This
provision allows the contractor to retain a sole license with the
sole right to grant sublicenses for purposes other than use in the
production or utilization of special nuclear material or atomic
energy.
"In power study agreements the Commission has employed
the so-called 'C-plus' patent clause. This provides, in effect, that
inventions conceived in connection with the work under an agree-
ment will be reported to the Commission and that the participant
will retain an exclusive, irrevocable, royalty-free license against
all but the government, with the right to grant sublicenses for
purposes other than use in the production or use of special nuclear
material or atomic energy. With respect to these uses, the par-
ticipant will retain a nonexclusive, irrevocable, royalty-free license.
The 'C-plus' type clause will be continued in study agreements
and will be used also in access and commercial agreements." 224
The Commission has proved itself highly capable of protecting
its rights in inventions of contractors and it has continued in the same
manner under the 1954 Act. Since persons operating under contract
are given advance indication of the disposition of their atomic inven-
tions and are presumably compensated accordingly, no practical ob-
jections can be raised to conditions to which the parties voluntarily
agree.
223. Id. at 426.
224. Hearings, supra note 205, at 193; see Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 159, 68
STAT. 948, 42 U.S.C. § 2189 (Supp. II, 1955).
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In proposing more satisfactory regulation of the patent field, it
may be advantageous to describe briefly conditions of patentability.
The provisions of conventional patent law are designed to prevent a
patentee from encroaching on the technical progress attributable to his
predecessors. An understanding of this fact should enable realization
of the fact that protection of past public expenditures, which ought to be
the legitimate scope of the section giving ownership to the Commission,
is adequately achieved by normal patent law. A patent gives the
patentee the right to exclude anyone else from practicing the invention
(that is, making or using it), without a license, for a period of seventeen
years. In order to earn such a privilege to exclude, the patent applicant
must not only produce something new, something not known in the
prior art, but he must produce something whose creation required
invention in view of the prior art, some development which would not
be an innovation obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the
particular art. And the 1954 Act states that even knowledge or use
which was under secrecy within the atomic energy program of the
United States shall be included in the prior art which a successful
patent applicant must surpass, even though he had no possibility of
access to it.225 Furthermore, principles or phenomena of nature, which
underlie all invention, are not themselves patentable at all.
Thus, all information, knowledge, inventions and discoveries
which the United States has uncovered or acquired during the course
of its atomic energy program are safely secured from private monopoly
and exploitation. Furthermore, any innovations which a person
skilled in the art might be expected to make in light of such knowledge
are likewise placed beyond the reach of private monopoly. In addition,
the Government has an inherent right to practice any invention for its
own purposes, irrespective of any private patent thereon, provided it
pays just compensation for doing so. 226 While it is just and fair that
all industry benefit from progress made at public expense, it does not
follow that all industry should benefit gratuitously from progress
achieved at private expense. Such a view would mean that the more
forward-looking segment of business contributes twice to atomic
progress, once to public development as a taxpayer and again when
bearing the cost of individual private research.
One potential situation exists which could justify government
ownership even of privately-financed invention. That would be the
225. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 155, 68 STAT. 947, 42 U.S.C. § 2185 (Supp. III,
1955).
226. See Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Amending the Atomic Energy Act of
1946, as Amended, and for Other Purposes, H.R. REP. No. 2181, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.
97 (1954) (minority). This right is also extended to contractors or subcontractors of
the Government. See 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (1952).
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instance where participation in the field is artificially limited, where
one party's presence precludes participation by another. This could
be the case if special nuclear material were scarce and rationing of it
led to a status of "ins" and "outs." However, recent announcements
of the allocation of over forty tons of special nuclear material for peace-
ful purposes demonstrate that this situation does not exist at the
present time. Hence, it would seem desirable that the section of the act
attributing conception of private invention to the Commission be
deleted.
The requirement of compulsory licensing is not subject to criticism
as being grossly unfair-the patentee is assured a reasonable royalty.
The major argument against such compulsion is that it has been dis-
cussed pro and con over a period of many years and the considered
decision has been against it. The atomic energy field does not appear
sufficiently different from other areas of science and invention to
warrant separate treatment. If the private patentee in the atomic
field has proved himself entitled to a patent at all, then his attendant
rights should be no less than those of any other patentee. If com-
pulsory licensing were indeed in the best public interest, then it should
be a part of all patent law.
It appears not unlikely, however, that popular opinion, uncog-
nizant of the nature of patent law or skeptical of it, may demand con-
tinued control of patents in the atomic domain. If so, then compulsory
licensing at reasonable and fair royalties offers a means for assuring
fair contribution by all those benefiting from privately sponsored
progress, yet with the assurance that no patentee will block the progress
of others unfairly. This is a palatable imposition, far preferable to
outright confiscation of invention by the Commission on an ad hoc
basis. Even so, the feeling of much of industry is that the United
States patent system is being progressively emasculated and that
hedging of the patentee's rights, such as occurs in the act, is already
stifling invention. 7 The Congress might well pay heed to this goose
which lays such golden eggs.
HEALTH AND SAFETY
The Recognized Hazard
Production or utilization of nuclear materials is inevitably ac-
companied by the presence of radioactivity. This form of radiant
energy in sufficient intensity is lethal to living things; in any intensity
it is harmful. Because of the highly penetrating nature of radioactivity
227. Wall Street Journal, April 10, 1956, p. 14, col. 3.
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artificially induced in it, by-product material can be dangerous even
where the material is confined. Special nuclear material, particularly
plutonium, presents extreme health hazards when ingested or inhaled,
because of its chemical nature and its natural radioactivity. The pos-
sibility is ever present that these materials may be widely scattered-
the typical suggestion being the leakage or explosion of a nuclear
reactor. A reactor of 100,000 kilowatt electrical capacity produces
200 pounds of fission product by-product material a year, the latter
being from three million to two billion times more deadly than chlorine,
the most potent common industrial poison.2 8 A reactor of 60,000
kilowatt electrical capacity creates enough fission products in one year
to contaminate, to the limits of tolerance, an area twenty-five miles on
a side to a height of one-half mile. 9
In its worst form, an explosion in a high pressure reactor, coupled
with a moderate wind, might produce a local small scale radioactive
fallout not unlike that popularized by weapons tests (aside from scat-
tering radioactivity, the explosion itself would probably do little harm
beyond a few hundred yards from the reactor). The American and
Canadian commissions have had three "runaways" with experimental
reactors-two of these being unplanned.3 °  None was of sufficient
violence to scatter radioactivity beyond the vicinity of the reactor,
but the reactor core, a mass of special nuclear material and fission
products, was melted on each occasion. A somewhat larger explosion
coupled with the rapid release of a high pressure coolant, such as would
be expected from a large power reactor, might have produced a vastly
different result in each instance. The Commission recognizes that
such hazards are inescapable." 1 A matter of equal practical importance
with the reactor accident hazard is that of the welfare of workers in
the field who are continually exposed to radioactivity in the course of
their routine duties.
It is to be expected that private ventures into such an inherently
dangerous field must be undertaken with consideration for the safety
of the participants and of the public. The act requires every licensee,
whether of materials or facilities, to adhere to safety standards pre-
228. Weil, The Hazard of Nuclear Power Plants, Tian Nzw ATomic E-RGY
LAw-WHAT IT MEANS TO INDUSTRY 155 (Atomic Industrial Forum Report 1954).
229. McCuLLOUGH, MiLLS & TELLER, TiE SAPETY or NucIxzAR REAcToRs 4 (1955).
230. The Canadian Commission had an unplanned runaway at the Chalk River site.
The American Commission had an unplanned runaway at Arco, Idaho (AEC News
Release, No. 808, April 5, 1956) and an experimental runaway at the Argonne National
Laboratory. Only the last of these was of explosive violence.
231. Hearings Before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 84th Cong., 2d Sess.
69 (1956) (statement of Commissioner Willard L. Libby) ; Hearings, supra note 205,
at 59.
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scribed by the Commission.2 32  Industry will feel the effects of such
standards in the selection of project sites, the design of equipment, the
establishment of methods of operation, the disposal of waste and the
selection of employee operators. The precise standards necessary to
assure safety often can be determined only after prolonged experiment
and experience, i.e., limits for human exposure to radiation have been
progressively decreased during the past fifteen years-they have been
halved within the last two years. England's maximum exposure limits
are currently one tenth of ours. As a practical matter, only the Com-
mission at present is qualified to determine what most official safety
standards should be. In addition, there exists the National Committee
on Radiation Protection, a group of scientists which recommends
standards that may supplement commission regulations. This group
and its recommendations are unofficial, although financially supported
by the Bureau of Standards.
The expense of meeting the appropriate standards can appreciably
affect the economics of atomic industry. Nevertheless, lack of adequate
knowledge about the subject will probably preclude any serious criticism
as to the reasonableness of many of the standards set, whatever they
may be. No matter whether private industry continues under the
present licensing system or whether it is given greater independence
along the lines previously suggested, adherence to safety regulations
established in the public interest must be accepted.
The Degree of Federal Preemption
Probably the most important question in safety regulation is the
relationship between the federal and state governments.2 ' The major
issue is, assuming Congress could have preempted the field, has it done
so? Has it intended that its safety regulations stand alone or has it
merely supplied the minimum standards? Or, assuming Congress
gave the Commission power to preempt the field, has the Commission
elected to do so? The Commission has never stated its views on these
matters when the question has been raised,234 although the private
view of certain of the commission staff is that federal law was intended
232. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, §§ 53(b), (e) (7), 63(b), 81, 103(b), 104,
161(b), (i), 68 STAT. 930, 931, 933, 935, 936, 937, 948, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2073(b), (e) (7),
2093(b), 2111, 2133(b), 2134, 2201(b), (i) (Supp. III, 1955) ; see 20 FED. REG. 5101
(1955) (10 C.F.R. proposed pt. 20). Those persons who have been exempted from
by-product and special nuclear material licenses are not required to adhere to the safety
regulations of part 20-this suggests that a general license should be given such persons,
rather than an exemption.
233. UNIVERsITY op MICHIGAN LAW SCHOoL, AToMIc ENERGY AND THE LAW
(1956) ; Krebs & Hamilton, The Role of the States in Atomic Development, 21 LAW
& CON TEMP. PROB. 182 (1956).
234. See Hearings, supra note 231, at 100-03, 176-77.
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to preempt the field. Officially, the Commission has only expressed
its attitude that it much prefers voluntary cooperation with the states
to a dispute as to who has control of what." 5
The problem of the extent of federal preemption of a field is an old
one, albeit of considerable recent interest, and one that admits of little
generalization or accurate prediction. A recent Supreme Court case
excerpt shows the three standards which courts are currently using in
making their decisions:
"First, [is] '[t]he scheme of federal regulation . . . so
pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left
no room for the States to supplement it.' "
"Second, [do] the federal statutes 'touch a field in which the
federal interest is so dominant that the federal system [must] be
assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same sub-
ject.' "
"Third, [does] enforcement of state . . . acts..
[present] a serious danger of conflict with the administration of
the federal program." "
In applying these tests to the health and safety regulation of the atomic
field, it might be recognized that there are at least four general sub-
divisions of the regulation and that the extent of preemption may be
different for each. These are considerations of reactor design, of
reactor location, of radioactive waste disposal and of human tolerance
to radiation exposure.
It is most likely that the federal aim of developing feasible types
of atomic reactors would largely be thwarted if state regulation were
recognized in this respect. Furthermore, both federal and state agencies
would be weighing the same factors in approving reactor designs-
there would seem to be no special considerations of interest to the
state which would not be weighed fully by the Commission. Thus,
federal preemption in this aspect might be expected.
The matter of project sites, on the other hand, is apt to be of
extreme local interest. No matter what scientific assurance may be
given as to the safety surrounding a given reactor, lay persons in the
vicinity may well feel differently, i.e., anyone whose home lies down-
wind from a reactor site, or lies within the range of even minute
235. See, e.g., address by Robert Lowenstein, AEC Office of the General Counsel,
Atoms for Peace Conference, Oklahoma City, April 16, 1956; Hearings, supra note
231, at 394; Price, The Civilian Application Program, COMMERCIAL AND INTERNA-
TIONAL DEVELOFMXNTs ix ATomic ENERGY 202-03 (Atomic Industrial Report No. 7,
1956).
236. Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 502-05 (1956) ; see California v. Zook,
336 U.S. 725 (1949) ; Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Co., 331 U.S. 218, 230-31 (1947).
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amounts of stray radiation therefrom, may rest uneasy, notwithstanding
any amount of technical assurance. Although the coverage from any
accident-caused fallout would be much less than that from weapons
tests, the effect on those concerned would be no different. Surely
local interests must be allowed to decide whether they wish to assume
the risk of locating a reactor in their midst-a reactor to serve New
York City should not be thrust into the proximity of Peekskill if the
latter objects. It might be advisable, as one condition of a license
application, that local acquiesence be obtained in advance. Whether
the Commission would regard an unwilling populace as unable to
interfere with the progress of a federally-controlled development pro-
gram remains to be seen.
The third health consideration is the disposal of radioactive waste.
These wastes may be far too radioactive to be emptied into the cus-
tomary sewage systems. Even "fixing" them so that they may be dis-
posed of in a given site without subsequent dispersal is a matter of
considerable complexity and expense. Choosing a site for their dis-
posal should be done only with local approval, since it amounts to a
virtual condemnation in perpetuity of the area selected. Yet, on the
other hand, potential escape of such wastes to a neighboring state, as
by leaching from ground water, gives the problem an interstate flavor
also.
The final problem of limits for human radiation exposure would
seem to involve no factors of peculiarly local interest. However, the
experience necessary to set standards is known to be largely deficient.
It is known that any degree of exposure entails some chance of
permanent injury; any standard falls short of being safe, merely amount-
ing to a calculated risk. If a state wishes to be more cautious of its
citizens' personal welfare, this seems well within its traditional police
power.
The degree of preemption determines whether state regulation is
totally precluded, whether state law may be made identical to federal
law, or whether state law may be made more strict than federal law."
Presumably, the constitutional supremacy clause 23 would prevent more
lenient state standards from excusing compliance with federal regula-
tion. Also, since a nuclear reactor accident could easily have conse-
quences extending across state lines, national regulation as to minimum
standards seems most desirable. The tone of a recent meeting of state
237. See, e.g., CAVMRS, SUMMARY OV PROCEDINGS, CONVERENCE Or STATE; RtPRz-
SENTATIVE$ ON T-Er AToMIc ENERGY COMMISSION LIC4NSING PROGRAM 40-42 (1955);
Krebs & Hamilton, supra note 233, at 182.
238. U.S. CoNsT. art. VI.
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representatives was a hope that the Commission would recognize the
validity of some state regulations.2 9 A bill was introduced in the last
Congress that would have required the Commission to relinquish health
and safety control to states so requesting.2 O The possible interstate
effect of potential accident or radioactive waste disposal, coupled with
the relative inexperience of the states in this area, would not recom-
mend such an extreme measure.
Perhaps the most practical and expedient act of the states, if
federal preemption does not preclude it, would be to embody the federal
standards in state law and enforce them accordingly. An adoption of
federal law for state law would enable any state to have a modern set
of safety standards with a minimum of effort. A uniform state law
certainly would ease the burden of industry, but there is no indication
that the Commission or anyone else is considering a general prototype
state act.241 One choice recently made available to the states in the
limited area of human radiation exposure is a model statute proposed
by the National Committee on Radiation Protection.
2
Intergovernmental Cooperation in Safety Regulation
Problems of enforcement still remain for either federal or state
safety standards. The Commission has indicated that its inspection
ability 243 will be limited to spot checking.2' Continuous surveillance,
apparently, must then be of local origin. The recent formation of a
state commission to advise the Commission on its health and safety
standards 1 45 should allow the states a voice in the formation of
federal regulations; cooperation in enforcement ought to be more
easily achieved in light of such action. If state assistance is expected for
enforcement of federal regulations, then financial aid presumably is
to be given the state agency by the Commission. 6  State inspection
arrangements of this type have been entered into with at least twenty-
two states by the Commission.
239. CAVERS, op. cit. supra note 237.
240. H.R. 8676, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956) (Rep. Carl Durham).
241. Hearings, supra note 231, at 100-03.
242. BURzAu or STANDARDS, HANDBOOK No. 61, RtGULATi N Or RADIATION
ExPosuRE BY LEaIsLAv MEANS (1955).
243. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 25(c), 68 STAT. 925, 42 U.S.C. § 2035(c)
(Supp. III, 1955).
244. Nelson, The AEC Inspection Program, COMMERCIAL AND INTERNATIONAL DE-
VELOPMXNTS IN AToMIC ENERGY 208 (Atomic Industrial Forum Report No. 7, 1956).
245. AEC News Release, No. 735, Nov. 25, 1955; 1 PAML ON TH IMPACT Or THE
PEACEPUL USES op ATOMIC ENERGY, PtACEFUL USES or ATOMIC EwERoY 13, 133-35
(Report to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy 1956).
246. See Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 161 (f), 68 STAT. 949, 42 U.S.C. § 2201(f)
(Supp. III, 1955).
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Under the act, the Commission is required to notify states of
commercial reactors to be located within their boundaries; 247 in prac-
tice, it also notifies the state of any reactor application or license.2 48
The Commission has stated that it can issue a license without receipt of
the state's view on the matter, but has said it would be greatly in-
fluenced by the latter. No mention is made of what happens if the
state interfered with the licensee after the license grant. The license
will not expressly require adherence to state law.24 9
Another conflict in safety regulation may arise between the
Commission and the foreign purchaser of a facility, such as a reactor.
Any facilities for utilizing or producing nuclear materials in the United
States must be constructed to conform to commission specifications.
However, foreign governments may differ as to the wisdom of such
specifications and may drop some and add others. If the domestic
manufacturer is required to satisfy the demands of both, this may
affect the willingness of a foreign customer to buy and will certainly
add increased costs which will handicap the domestic manufacturer in
meeting foreign competition. If it seems apparent that the foreign
countries should set their own safety standards, it might be conjectured
what adverse international feeling could arise from an accident resulting
from supply of a facility which the Commission recognized as unsafe.
LIABILITY
Discussion of health and safety measures leads naturally to con-
sideration of liability for harm resulting from various nuclear activities
and to the availability of insurance protection. The kinds of liability
which can result from atomic activities are vast in number. Mere
prolonged exposure to everyday operation of a reactor will result in
radiation harm to employees; for the person who has had several
employers in the course of his radiation work, a difficult problem may
arise in determining when he incurred a particularly damaging dosage.
Apportionment of his damages may be the only feasible answer. As
the average worker becomes more familiar with the severe personal
injury hazards associated with even moderate radiation exposure, em-
ployers' problems and expenses are sure to multiply. The everpresent
danger of a reactor runaway must be acknowledged; minor accidents
could harm workmen, major accidents could lead to property damage
and personal injury for those in the path of radioactive debris. Radio-
247. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 182(b), 68 STAr. 954, 42 U.S.C. § 2232(b)
(Supp. III, 1955).
248. Hearings, supra note 231, at 104; CAvms, op. cit. supra note 237.
249. Id. at 4, 7.
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active wastes may escape while in transit or after deposit and thereby
endanger both persons and property. The mere proximity of nuclear
activities which interfere with the enjoyment or value of land might be
actionable as private nuisances. Other personal injuries could stem
from overexposure in the course of handling materials in transit or
during medical treatment. The potential liability of manufacturers
and suppliers of nuclear products, such as reactors and fuel elements,
not only to transferees of the products but also to persons injured by
the latter's use of such products, poses the complex problems that go
with third-party liability of suppliers of chattels.
Legal Bases of Liability
Probably no part of the atomic field is so unsettled as that sur-
rounding the potential tort liability of the participants." ° Since the act
makes no reference as to how such liability for injuries and damage
is to be assessed, the resort must be to conventional tort law, either
the common law or state statutes. The problem may be exemplified by
envisaging a reactor accident, as described above, which leads to in-
juries to persons and property at some distance from the reactor site.
The reactor owner offers the immediate resort for liability. Being
a public utility, it may present a very lush target for suit. Liability
may seem self-evident to the layman; but the lawyer must consider
several possible bases of legal liability. Tort liability, that liability of
one private person to another, conventionally rests upon three concepts:
liability for intentional harm inflicted on another, liability for harm
resulting from a person's negligent conduct or lack of due care toward
another, and strict liability which may be imposed on a party for harm
which he causes to another even though through no fault of his own.
The case of intentionally-inflicted harm is so straightforward as not
to warrant further elaboration.
The doctrine of strict liability is generally heralded as stemming
from an English case, Rylands v. Fletcher,"' wherein the judge of the
Exchequer Chamber stated:
"[T]he person who for his own purposes brings on his land and
collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes,
must keep it in at his peril, and, if he does not do so, is prima facie
answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of
its escape." 252
250. See Becker & Huard, Tort Liability and the Atomic Energy Industry, 44 Gpo.
L. J. 58 (1955).
251. [1866] L.R. 1 Ex. 265.
252. Id. at 279.
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On review, the House of Lords restricted such liability to instances
where the defendant was making a non-natural use of his land. As so
modified, the theory has been generally recognized in the United
States .2 3 The Restatement view, which relaxes the theory by ignoring
the non-natural use requirement but which restricts it by emphasizing a
risk of serious harm which cannot be eliminated by the exercise of due
care, 54 has not been followed by most courts.
Barring statutory intervention, the general agreement of writers is
to the effect that the reactor owner will find himself facing strict liability
for damage caused by his reactor.
"The first case involving damage from the escape of radiation
from the use of atomic energy has yet to reach the courts. When
it does, it is not difficult to predict that there is no court which will
refuse to apply to it the principle of strict liability found in the
cases which follow Rylands v. Fletcher." "
If the court were unwilling to impose strict liability, perhaps because
of the social utility contributed by nuclear enterprise, the next avenue of
resort would be that of negligence. Direct proof of negligence would
be the most certain way to effect recovery. But the circumstances of
a reactor accident may well obliterate or make inaccessible all traces
of evidence which would indicate the cause of the accident. In such
case, the injured party would have to depend on circumstantial evidence
from which negligence could be inferred-in other words, this would
seem a proper situation for application of the res ipsa loquitur
doctrine.
2 56
The impressive reactor record of the Commission over the past
fourteen years, wherein there has been no serious personal injury,
tends to prove that such accidents ordinarily would not occur in the
absence of negligence; 27 the exclusive control over the reactor by
the owner should adequately show the defendant's responsibility for
negligence associated with the instrumentality, as well as a lack of
contributory negligence. The plaintiff need not eliminate all other
possible causes of the accident-he need only show, on the whole, that
the most likely fact is that the defendant was negligent, although it is
253. See PROSSER, TORTS 329-38 (2d ed. 1955).
254. RSTATsMXNT, TORTS §§ 519-24 (1938).
255. PROssmR, TORTS 336 (2d ed. 1955); see ATomic INDUSTRIAL FORUM, PRP-
LIMINARY RSoRT ON FINANCIAL PROTECTION AGAINST ATomic HAZARDS 9 (Atomic
Industrial Forum Report 1956); Trowbridge, The Atomic Energy Act of 1954,
Aromic ENERGY-THE NEW INDUSTRIAL FRONTIER 203, 210-11 (Atomic Industrial
Forum Report 1955).
256. See PROSSER, TORTS 199-217 (2d ed. 1955).
257. Graham, United States Reactor Operating History: 1943-1954, 13 NuC=E-
oNics 42 (1955) ; Hearings, supra note 231, at 35.
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not known in exactly what way. This approach differs from strict
liability in that it is open to the defendant to show that he did use due
care and was not negligent. In this respect, the effect of his compliance
with federal and state safety standards will have to be considered as
a measure of due care.
Under either strict liability or negligence, the plaintiff must show
that his injury was proximately caused by the defendant's activity.
Normally, any substantial contribution of such activity to the plaintiff's
injury will suffice. However, unforeseeable intentional acts of third
parties (who thereby assume the liability) or acts of nature may relieve
the defendant if they are regarded as intervening forces. The claim of
freak weather, i.e., strong winds and rain which might carry released
radioactivity long distances and deposit it in erratic manner, might be
one of the more obvious of such causes. However, the government
weapons tests have shown that freak weather is not unforeseeable but
rather may be expected and may lead to deposits of radioactive fallout
at long distances and diverse directions from the site of release. This
experience of causes and results which are unforeseeable in particular
but predictable in general may contribute heavily to a finding of prox-
imate cause from the defendant's activity. In practice, a plaintiff's
radiation injury, coupled with a showing of exposure to the defendant's
radioactivity, should be enough to enable him to go to the jury; this
ought to be essentially tantamount to recovery.
It is difficult to envisage defenses of contributory negligence or
assumption of risk as applied against third persons not associated
with the atomic venture. It is conceivable that these might be valid
against some injuries sustained on the premises of an atomic venture,
i.e., by employees or visitors. Whether advance waivers acquired
from such persons would be effective is largely a matter of public policy.
Persons Potentially Liable
Persons other than the reactor owner may likewise be brought into
focus for liability. It is virtually the universal view in this country
that suppliers of chattels for consideration may be liable for harm to
person or property of third parties who may be expected to be in the
vicinity of probable use, at least if the supplier has failed to exercise
reasonable care to make his chattel safe for its intended use.', Under
the current trend in the law, strict liability may even be imposed on
suppliers for inherently dangerous chattels. The supplier of chattels
258. See PROSsER, TORTS 497-519 (2d ed. 1955); RESTATE ENT, TORTS §§ 388-98
(1934).
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may be the maker of a component part of a reactor, the assembler of
the parts, the fabricator of fuel elements for the reactor, the maker
of safety devices and so forth. The negligence of the user of the chattel
in not discovering the defect may be no excuse for the supplier,
especially for inherently dangerous chattels. Discovery of a defect in
a fuel element for a reactor might not be made even by a reactor owner
exercising due care, since the defect could lie within sealed units so
as to defy detection; furthermore, these fuel elements made of poisonous
materials and intended for dangerous usage probably fit nicely into
that exception of dangerous chattels which precludes absolution of the
supplier because of the user's negligence. The supplier also may be
strictly liable to the user for defective chattels, under a legally-imposed
implied warranty that the goods are safe for their intended use, at least
so long as the user is ignorant of the defect." 9 Even the building
contractor for the reactor may be liable for subsequent injuries to third
parties under the expanding scope of the law.26°
Thus, fuel element fabricators and reactor builders become potential
defendants; being large corporations, they present especially attractive
defendants for suit. Suppliers of the special nuclear material, i.e., the
Government or reprocessors, are less likely to be involved inasmuch as
the fabricator subsequently performs so many operations on the ma-
terial, including meltings and alloyings, as to break any thread of
proximate causation running back to them. Even so, the Government
requires that private owners and some foreign users under agreements
for cooperation indemnify it against any liability arising out of use of
the material,26' and it specifically disclaims any warranty as to the
safe nature of the material for any purpose, including those which it
has approved (the same disclaimer also applies to material supplied
tc foreign countries under agreements for cooperation) .62 This in-
demnification and absence of warranty should not affect the right of
a third party to sue the Government, if he were otherwise entitled to
do so. However, the opinion of the Commission's general counsel
has been that the Government will not recognize any liability arising
from use of the material which it supplies."
The inability to determine exactly what party's conduct was the
cause of the accident will encourage suits against multiple defendants.
259. See PROSSgR, ToRTs 491-96 (2d ed. 1955).
260. Id. at 514-19.
261. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 53(e) (8), 68 STAT. 931, 42 U.S.C.
§2073(e)(8) (Supp. Ii, 1955).
262. 21 Fi. R1o. 767 (1956) (10 C.F.R. § 70.37) ; see Atomic Industrial Forum
Memo, June 1956, p. 45.
263. Hearings, supra note 231, at 110, 113.
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One theory of suit may be that the reactor owner, the reactor builder,
the fuel element fabricator, the maker of safety devices and so forth
are engaged in a joint enterprise. This theory should be most success-
ful for the prototype reactors, wherein each of the foregoing partici-
pants is apt to be performing his services for less than cost as a sort
of experiment and source of experience. Thus, all might be liable by
imputation regardless of which one actually caused the accident.
On the other hand, if the various parties are viewed as alternatively
liable, that is, if the plaintiff only can show that some one out of this
group had to be the responsible party and that the others are not
charged with that person's conduct by imputation, then difficulties arise.
Under the conventional view, circumstantial evidence of negligence
cannot be used against parties in the alternative. However, several
recent cases seemingly have allowed such procedure."' This view
becomes most tenuous when it is clearly apparent that one party's
negligence must necessarily preclude negligence of the other.265
Nuisance
In view of the predictable hazards from reactor operation, a prop
erty owner may find that the enjoyment and value of his property are
markedly decreased, and the insurance premiums appreciably increased,
by the location of a reactor in his vicinity. In such a case, must he
await an actual accident before having any legal remedy? If there is
an interference with his use and enjoyment which would be substantial
to an ordinary person in the community, without an overbalancing
social utility in the continuance of the activity, the owner may have an
action for private nuisance against the reactor owner.266 Even scientific
assurance of the safety may be viewed with skepticism by lay persons
of the community. "[T]he dread of contagion from a pesthouse, com-
mon to ordinary citizens, may make it a nuisance, although there is
no foundation in scientific fact." 26
A finding of private nuisance requires that the defendant's conduct
must be unreasonable, that is, its utility must be balanced against the
risk of the harm which it creates. The legislature cannot give industry
immunity to such suits because this would be tantamount to eminent
264. Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944); Nichols v. Nold,
174 Kan. 613, 258 P.2d 317 (1953) ; Loch v. Confair, 377 Pa. 212, 93 A.2d 451 (1953).
265. See Litzman v. Humboldt County, 273 P.2d 82 (Cal. App. 1954).
266. See PROSSER, TORTS 389-426 (2d ed. 1955) ; RESTATEMENT, TORTS §§ 822-31
(1939); UNIVMRSITr OV MICHIGAN LAW ScHooL, ATomic ENMRGY AND THx LAW
(1956).
267. PRossER, TORTS 396-97 (2d ed. 1955). See also cases cited in id. at 407 n.8_.
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domain, requiring just compensation. 68 In fact, utilities have been
subjected to such suits in the past for various of their activities.269
Although the potential remedies for private nuisance include both an
injunction and damages, the general interest of the public in atomic
progress may make the former relief inappropriate. The latter, requir-
ing a showing of actual injury, physical or mental, becomes much like
strict liability.
Immunity
A still further complication arises where the responsible party is
a body which is normally immune to private suit. These bodies include
the federal government, state governments, municipal corporations and
often hospitals and universities. Immunity of the federal government
is partially waived under the Federal Tort Claims Act 270 for acts of
negligence but the waiver does not extend to "discretionary activities."
Two federal district court cases have regarded the atomic weapons
testing program of the Commission as such a discretionary activity,
271
although one conceded that there might be actionable negligence in a
ministerial function associated with such testing.272 A fortiori, the
Government's own peacetime reactor program would seem discretionary
although, again, negligence in ministerial functions surrounding reactor
operation should be the immediate cause of accidents associated with
government-owned reactors. Whether government liability could be
attached to operations by private industry through the former's owner-
ship of special nuclear material and possible negligence in the function
of inspection remains in doubt. As already mentioned, the Commis-
sion's expressed opinion is in the negative.
One last resort in seeking governmental liability could be a claim
of eminent domain, which requires compensation under the Federal
Constitution and most state constitutions. Mere lowering of property
values by reactor proximity is probably not a compensable "tak-
ing"; 273 however, extended deprivation of property through contamina-
tion by radioactivity from reactor accident, especially by government
owned materials, might be sufficient to qualify.
268. The legislature cannot immunize persons against private nuisance suits since.
this is regarded as condemnation of property without just compensation. Richards v.
Washington Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546 (1914); Baltimore & Potomac R.R. v. Fifth
Baptist Church, 108 U.S. 317 (1882).
269. Annot., 37 A.L.R. 800 (1925).
270. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-80 (1952).
271. Bartholomae Corp. v. United States, 135 F. Supp. 651 (S.D. Cal. 1955);
Bulloch v. United States, 133 F. Supp. 885 (D. Utah 1955).
272. Ibid.
273. See U.S.C.A. CONST. amend. 5, at 206 n.65 and 207 n.75 (Supp. 1955).
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It would seem only fair that the federal government accept liability
for private injury and damage resulting from its own atomic ventures,
at least for negligence of any kind, whether in the weapons field or in
the reactor or other peaceful programs. This liability should have no
such inadequate limit as the $5,000 currently available through settle-
ment with the Commission of private claims resulting from weapons
tests. 4
With regard to licensees normally immune to suit, it might be a
matter of good policy to require that they waive their immunity in
this respect before they are granted a license from the Commission.
Municipal corporations may not be able to claim immunity if their
atomic activities may be shown to be proprietary rather than govern-
mental.
It might be expected that attempts by industry to minimize or
limit their potential liability would include separate incorporation of
that part of the industry engaged in nuclear work, maybe even separate
incorporation of each power reactor plant. The legal effect of such
measures may be as much in doubt as the ethics. The Commission has
given indication that it will look to the financial responsibility of the
licensee before approving his activity 7 8-but no suggestion has been
made that this will include his ability to respond to damage claims.
It has been indicated in hearings by the Joint Committee that the act
did not contemplate such a condition for license. 6
Another consideration is that of the statute of limitations, which
dictates the maximum time period which can elapse between injury
and the initiation of suit for recovery. Radiation injuries are especially
insidious in that they may manifest themselves only after passage of
many years from the date of exposure; for example, radiation-caused
cancer has never appeared in much less than five years from the date
of exposure; genetic effects appear only after the birth of children.
Almost all state tort statutes of limitation expire in one to three years,
a time limit far too short for these unique type injuries. Even the
1954 Act imposes a one-year maximum for claims settled by the
Commission for injuries resulting from radiation created and spread by
atomic weapons tests 277-- and the Federal Tort Claims Act has a
two-year statute of limitations.2 78  If extension of these various
274. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 167, 68 STAT. 952, 42 U.S.C. § 2207 (Supp. III,
1955).
275. 21 FXD. RZG. 358, 766 (1956) (10 C.F.R. §§ 50.40, 70.23e); AEC News Re-
lease, No. 764, Jan. 18, 1956; Hearings, supra note 231, at 107.
276. Id. at 107-09.
277. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 167, 68 STAT. 952, 42 U.S.C. § 2207 (Supp.
III, 1955).
278. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (1952).
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statutes is not made promptly, defendants may view their acquired
immunity to suit as a vested right. Legislatures will likely balk at
making such extensions retroactive; there may even be a constitutional
cloud over retroactivity as a violation of due process.
Limitation of Liability
If the determination of tort liability must be settled by state
statutes or common law, there are obvious disadvantages. Any expecta-
tion of uniformity of liability would be fallacious. Some states might
elect to attract reactor projects by limiting liability, thus possibly de-
priving injured parties in adjacent states of adequate recourse. More-
over, before thus limiting liability, states should be certain they are
not depriving their own citizens of insurance settlements which would
be available for more liberal liability. States may have different opin-
ions as to the effect of a defendant's adherence to all federal and state
safety regulation. Yet, state law imposing liability for violation of
standards more strict than the federal regulations would again raise
the question of conflict with possible federal preemption of the safety
field. Uncertainties as to the extent of liability will render even more
difficult the problem of providing insurance-thus retarding atomic
progress. The possibility of a federal atomic tort law merits serious
consideration.
One possible federal resolution of the problem was contained in a
bill presented to the past Congress. This bill proposed limitation of
liability of the licensee of a facility, his contractors and subcontractors
to an amount double the capital value of his facility.
"The licensee of a production or utilization facility shall not
be liable in damages for the malfunctioning of such facility in an
aggregate amount more than twice the original capital cost of such
facility. The aggregate of this limitation shall extend to, and
include all contractors and subcontractors of the licensee in the
design, construction, or operation of such facility. . ,, 279
This proposal harnesses the public with another subsidization of private
nuclear programs and seems to have no justification in logic except to
encourage private programs at the expense of the public. For projects
such as that of Consolidated Edison, where the village of Peekskill is
the site of a reactor whose power is destined for New York, little claim
can be made that the populace are getting a proportionate benefit from
the risk imposed on them. The constitutional basis of such a provision
279. H.R. 9802, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956) (Rep. Sterling Cole).
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is also hazy, since it essentially amounts to condemnation of one citizen's
person and property to the benefit of another, without corresponding
just compensation."'0  Whether the bankruptcy clause 181 would ade-
quately support such a law is doubtful-the licensee may well not be
bankrupt by any customary definition of the word. Reliance on the
constitutional bases of general welfare and the common defense and
security is also of dubious validity for a condemnation-type statute.
Of far more merit is the suggestion of an Atomic Compensation Act,
assessing maximum but just statutory damages so as to take the
excess profit out of tort suits; 282 even ad hoc settlement might be left
to an administrative agency rather than to a local jury.
INSURANCE
The potential magnitude of injury and damage, coupled with the
uncertainty of liability, would be expected to make insurance risks
hard to calculate and coverage difficult to obtain. This has proved to
be the case.
Private Insurance
Workers in the field have found their insurance relatively simple
to obtain. Workmen's compensation generally is regarded as covering
any radiation injury-some states specifically so provide. 28s Some need
for modification of these laws may exist in the requirement of timely
notice-the period may be too short for radiation injury, analogous to
the discussion on statutes of limitation. Also, the causal relationship
between injury and exposure may be difficult or impossible to prove
by ordinary methods.
Over 99.7 per cent of all commission employees have been able
to obtain life, accident and health insurance exactly as though they
were working in an ordinary industrial plant 284 However, it must be
recognized that the safety which has been achieved for government
employees has entailed an expense which may be beyond the ability of
private industry to bear.
280. Hearings, supra note 231, at 244.
281. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
282. Cousins, Civic Responsibilities With a Metropolitan Reactor, COMM ,ERCIAL AND
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS IN ATOMIC ENERGY 344 (Atomic Industrial Forum
Report No. 7, 1956).
283. See 1 PANEL ON THE IMPACT OP THE PtACEVUL Uses op' AToM[IC ENERGY, op.
cit. supra note 245, at 126; Discussion on Insurance Problems of the Atomic Industry,
THE Nnw AToMIC ENERGY LAw-WIAT IT MEANS TO INDUSTRY 175, 176 (Atomic
Industrial Forum Report 1954).
284. Stratton, Ramification of Insurance Problems of the Atomic Industry,
ATOMIC ENsRGY-THt NEw INDUSTRIAL FRONTIER 244, 245 (Atomic Industrial Forum
Report 1955).
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Otherwise, however, the insurance problem remains largely un-
settled. The risk of reactor accident may be conceded as very small.
Nevertheless, the damage from an accident could be huge (although it
need not be) and it is most questionable whether either the utilities,
their suppliers or their insurance companies could justify such gambling
of assets that were accrued for more ordinary purposes and risks. The
generally expressed attitude is summarized by one official of a leading
utility: "At this time we do not see any sound basis on which we can
risk our solvency on the possibility, remote as it may be, of a major
nuclear catastrophe." M
The private insurance companies, stock and mutual, have been
conducting a study for some time and their latest report suggests that
the stock companies may be able to offer coverage of about fifty million
dollars for third-party liability and an equivalent amount for property
damage insurance. The mutuals expect to offer about fifteen million
dollars, which may be apportioned between third-party liability and
the insured's property according to the insured's option .28  These
insurance limits are to represent all insurable interests associated with
any single accident-an interesting problem will arise in apportioning
this maximum among the reactor owner, the reactor builder, the
fabricator and others. For the sake of comparison, the largest liability
insurance now carried by a single person is in the region of fifteen
million dollars.
This private coverage is being achieved by the formation of
syndicates 287 which are exhausting the foreign market in their quest
for reinsurance. Thus, the atomic industry has no further private
insurance resources to investigate. The insurance which any company
can offer on a single risk is limited by state law, generally being less
than ten per cent of the company's capital. Even most of this is
reinsured, however, so that the original insurer normally retains less
than one per cent of its capital tied to a single risk. For atomic in-
surance, companies may be willing to raise this percentage to about
1 Y2 per cent. The rates reputedly will be set by a designated rating
organization with no chance for negotiating between insured and in-
surer; the annual premium will run about one-tenth of one per cent of the
coverage. The insurance apparently will not be offered on a "deduct-
285. Hearings Before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 84th Cong. 2d Sess.
240 (1956). See also id. at 262, 502, 526-29.
286. AEC News Release, No. 796, March 19, 1956; AEC News Release, No. 662,
July 13, 1955; AToMIC INDUSTRIAL FORUM, PRELIMINARY REPORT ON FINANCIAL PRO-
T4CTION AGAINST ATomiC HAZARDS 11 (1956).
287. Nuclear Energy Liability Insurance Association (stock casualty companies) ;
Nuclear Energy Property Insurance Association (stock fire and property companies) ;
Mutual Atomic Energy Pool (mutual fire and casualty companies).
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ible" basis, since the insurance companies desire to handle all third-
party claims ab initio, thus improving their chances of establishing
favorable legal precedent.
As reactor entrepreneurs insure, insurance companies may try to
drop duplicate coverage from the individual policies of third parties,
at least for personal injury and property damage-but probably not for
life insurance. These proposals for eliminating minor pyramiding
coverage may well run into opposition from state regulatory agencies
and policy holders.
The effect of antitrust law upon such syndication is not of serious
concern, apparently. Some companies do not regard the field as
particularly profitable and state that their motivation is primarily to
meet a demand by existing customers. The desire to limit government
entry into the field is doubtless a further incentive.
Government Insurance
Even the foregoing offer of private insurance is generally re-
garded as inadequate for the potential risks involved with a nuclear
reactor. Reactor owners and their suppliers appear to regard this
obstacle as one of the most difficult in the advance of atomic industry.
Since industry will not or cannot proceed until more insurance is
available, insurance by the Government is rapidly gaining in favor as
the only recourse, short of imposing an involuntary risk and subsidy on
the public. s88  Government indemnification has always been required
in the past to induce private industry to undertake projects for the
Commission. A current question on federal insurance is whether the
Government should insure from the ground up or merely offer topping
insurance for that risk which the private companies cannot cover. The
spirit of the act suggests the obvious answer-private insurance should
be encouraged to the maximum, leaving only excess coverage for the
Government.
There is little the Commission can do to provide insurance under
the present act; the law specifically precludes any subsidization of in-
dustry and requires industry to hold the Government harmless for
liability resulting from the use of special nuclear material." 9 Several
possibilities of amending legislation have been proposed, including
288. See Atomic Energy Clearing House, May 21, 1956, pp. 3-9 (report of hearings
on insurance before the congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy); ATOMIC
INDusTRIAL FORUM, PRELIMINARY REPORT ON FINANCIAL PROTECTION AGAINST
ATOMIC HAZARDS 23 (1956) ; Wall Street Journal, May 17, 1956, p. 2, col. 2. Contra,
1 PANEL ON THE IMPACT Or THE P4AcErUL USES or ATOMIC ENERGY, op. Cit. supra
note 245, at 12-13, 128.
289. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, §§ 53(e) (8), 169, 68 STAr. 931, 952, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2073(e) (8), 2209 (Supp. iii, 1955).
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bills introduced in the last session of Congress. The earliest proposal
was the Price bill:
"Be it enacted . . . that (1) for a period of 10 years from
the date of passage of this Act the Atomic Energy Commission
shall, upon request, indemnify each owner, operator, manu-
facturer, designer and builder of a production or utilization fa-
cility, as defined in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, and
each supplier of equipment, material or services for such fa-
cility, as interests appear, against uninsured liability to mem-
bers of the public for bodily injury or death and property
damage arising from nuclear hazards, subject to the condition that
primary non-governmental insurance against such liability has
been procured in amounts deemed reasonably adequate by the
Commission to provide against normal contingencies; and (2)
each indemnification shall be evidenced by an agreement which
shall become effective upon its execution and shall cover the liabil-
ity for events occurring thereafter and during the useful life of
the facility." 20
Two omissions on much-discussed issues were evident in the above
bill. First, no compulsion was made that industry insure at all. Such
a requirement should be made in fairness to the public. Second, no
premium was exacted for government insurance. The desirability of
such a giveaway was challenged by those who felt that nuclear power
should operate on a competitive basis with conventional power.
A bill proposed in the closing days of the past session, by Chair-
man Anderson of the Joint Committee, would have required the
Commission to insert in each license a condition specifying the amount
and type of private "financial protection" the licensee must have to
cover public liability claims. 9' The Government then would provide
up to 500 million dollars topping indemnification covering all insurable
interests associated with any single reactor accident. Private liability
would be limited by statute to the amount of total coverage available,
private insurance plus government indemnification, excess losses being
compensated for by private legislation, if at all. Annual premiums
would be minimal, i.e., a maximum of thirty dollars per 1,000 kilowatt
capacity. Waiver of a licensee's immunity to public liability could be
required as a condition of license. The indemnification would be
obtainable for licenses granted before August 1, 1966, but would cover
all incidents during the life of the license, once obtained. The Com-
mission would be given authority to settle claims, apparently without
290. H.R_ 9701, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956) (Rep. Melvin Price).
291. S. 4112, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956) (Sen. Clinton P. Anderson).
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regard to legal liability laws of any state and without judgment of
liability by any court.
Any ultimately approved bill will probably be an amalgamation
of the Anderson bill with a bill proposed by Representative Cole, which
had the support of the Commission. 2 The latter bill was rather poorly
received. It would have required no financial responsibility as a
condition of license; it would have provided unlimited government
indemnification or reinsurance, but only for amounts in excess of the
maximum insurance available from private sources. The premiums
would be derived from private insurance rates and would be reserved
to apply against future claims. The government obligation would not
be effective in cases of certain conduct by the officials of the licensee.
It would seem that a change in the law should incorporate certain
features of both bills. Financial responsibility should be a license
condition in order that the public need not rely upon the sagacity of
industry for its recovery of losses. The government obligation should
begin only after private insurance has been exhausted and rates should
be set according to probable loss insofar as is possible-unless the
philosophy of no subsidy to private industry, as stated in the 1954
Act, is to be reversed. Similarly, premiums should be used to defray
payments of claims for loss. No limit should be placed on government
liability; private losses should be reimbursed totally, perhaps by ad-
ministrative settlement. If the Government cannot afford to do so,
then the merit of the atomic program requires re-evaluation. In reality,
however, any change is more apt to limit government indemnity to a
fixed amount, make it available before all private sources have been
utilized, assess a token premium and limit private liability to the amount
of insurance and indemnification.
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
The new act, in contrast to the old, advocates a program of inter-
national cooperation.2 93 The interest of foreign countries in develop-
ing the utilization of atomic energy is growing just as it is in this
country. In fact, the higher costs of power in most such countries
give them an added incentive to develop nuclear energy. American
industry will undoubtedly desire to bid for a fair share of this expand-
ing foreign market and provisions of the act controlling such enter-
prise are important.
292. H.R. 11242, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956) (Rep. Sterling Cole).
293. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 3(e), 68 STAr. 922, 42 U.S.C. § 2013(e)
(Supp. III, 1955).
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Limitations on International Dealings
All three types of nuclear material may be shipped abroad subject
to certain conditions. Foreign distribution of special nuclear material
must be made pursuant to the terms of an agreement for cooperation
between the United States and the country of the receipient.294 Source
material can be distributed abroad either under terms of such an agree-
ment for cooperation or upon a determination by the Commission that
such activity will not be inimical to the interests of the United States.295
By-product material may be given foreign distribution either under an
agreement for cooperation or where the Commission's opinion is that
such distribution would not be inimical to the common defense and
security; for this type material, the Commission is authorized to make
the same charge as for domestic distribution and may require reports
regarding the use of material so distributed.296 Foreign distribution
of special nuclear material can be done only by the Commission; 297 such
distribution of source 298 and by-product materials 299 can be done either
by the Commission or by private persons licensed to do so. Under
the previously discussed allocation by the President, the United States
is prepared to supply 20,000 kilograms of U-235 for sale or lease
(or gift 3) to foreign users, in enrichment of up to twenty per
cent.301
It has been mentioned that the export of either a production or
utilization facility requires a commission license.80 2 Whether this
be a research and development 3 03 or a commercial facility, 04 the statu-
tory limitation is the same. The export license must be pursuant to an
agreement for cooperation existing between the United States and
the government of the country of the recipient, except that the Com-
mission may give a license for the export of items that are component
294. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 54, 68 STAT. 931, 42 U.S.C. § 2074 (Supp.
III, 1955).
295. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 64, 68 STAT. 933, 42 U.S.C. § 2094 (Supp.
III, 1955).
296. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, §82, 68 STAT. 935, 42 U.S.C. §2112 (Supp.
III, 1955).
297. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, §§ 54, 57(a) (2), 68 STAT. 931, 932, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2074, 2077(a) (2) (Supp. III, 1955).
298. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, §§ 62, 69, 68 STAT. 932, 934, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2092,
2099 (Supp. III, 1955).
299. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, §§ 81, 82(c), 68 STAT. 935, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2111,
2112(c) (Supp. III, 1955).
300. Hearings, mupra note 285, at 334-35.
301. Address by Clark L. Vogel, AEC Division of International Affairs, Atomic
Industrial Forum Conference, Atlanta, April 18, 1956.
302. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, §§ 101, 109, 68 STAT. 936, 939, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2131, 2139 (Supp. III, 1955).
303. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 104(d), 68 STAT. 937, 42 U.S.C. § 2134(d)
(Supp. III, 1955).
304. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 103(d), 68 STAT. 937, 42 U.S.C. § 2133(d)
(Supp. III, 1955).
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parts of such facilities if the Commission determines in writing that
each export does not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common
defense and security.
No restricted data may be exchanged with persons in other nations
except as authorized by the President and even then the exchange
must be undertaken pursuant to an agreement for cooperation or to an
agreement existing as of the effective date of the act.805 Furthermore,
no restricted data concerning design or fabrication of atomic weapons
may be exchanged under any circumstances.
One final restriction on private international activity is that no
one may directly or indirectly engage in the production of any special
nuclear material outside the United States except under an agreement
for cooperation or upon authorization by the Commission following a
determination that such activity will not be inimical to the interest of
the United StatesY" A moment's reflection should give an apprecia-
tion of the potential magnitude of this superficially innocuous provi-
sion, a potential which has given industry many headaches. For example,
industry representatives could not even discuss most unclassified matters
abroad with foreign industry unless the provisions were met-virtually
any subject matter could be indirectly linked to the production of
special nuclear material. However, acting under the statutory author-
ity, the Commission has given a general authorization for activities
in foreign countries, except members of the Soviet bloc, provided
no communication of restricted data or other classified defense in-
formation is involved.30 7  These latter activities still require specific
sanction. Most commercial dealings involving modern design power
reactors will, in fact, be of the latter kind so that the general authoriza-
tion does not have too much effect in clearing the way for industrial
negotiations
03
"Agreements for Cooperation" and "International Arrangements"
Since so many foreign transactions hinge upon an "agreement for
cooperation," 309 a knowledge of the nature of this type agreement is
important. Such an agreement, as applied to peaceful uses of atomic
energy, is an agreement initiated by the Commission between the United
305. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, §§141, 144, 68 STAT. 940, 942, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2161, 2164 (Supp. III, 1955).
306. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 57(a) (3), 68 STAT. 932, 42 U.S.C. §
2077 (a) (3) (Supp. III, 1955).
307. 21 F4D. R.o. 418 (1956) (10 C.F.R. pt. 110).
308. 1 PANL ON TH4 IMPACT OP TE PEACFXUL USES or ATomiC ENERGY, PAcE-
Pux Uss op ATomic E, RaY 134-35 (Report to the joint Committee on Atomic Energy
1956).
309. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, §§ 11(b), 123, 68 STAT. 922, 940, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2014(b), 2153 (Supp. III, 1955).
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States and any nation or regional defense organization, which has the
approval of the President and which has thereafter been submitted to
the Joint Committee for a period of thirty days while Congress is in
session. Because of the two-party nature, these agreements are
popularly termed "bilaterals." The cooperating party must agree to
maintain security safeguards and standards as set forth in the agree-
ment, must guarantee that no material transferred shall be used for any
military purpose, and must guarantee that material or restricted data
supplied will not be transferred to unauthorized persons or beyond the
jurisdiction of the cooperating party except as the agreement may
specify.
In addition to negotiations made with industry or with the Com-
mission under these agreements for cooperation, the act provides that
a foreign nation may deal with the United States in matters of peace-
ful use of atomic energy by another means, the "international arrange-
ment." "1' This is defined as an international agreement approved
by the Congress (requiring a majority of both the House and the
Senate) or any treaty (requiring a two-thirds vote of the Senate), but
does not include an agreement for cooperation. Under one section
of the act, the President is specifically authorized to enter into such
international arrangements but actual cooperation with any nation
must still be pursuant to an agreement for cooperation. Under another
section of the act, however, an international arrangement will auto-
matically supersede the act or any action of the Commission in case
of conflict' 1 and the Commission is directed to give maximum effect
to the arrangement in its subsequent functions.312  If the latter section
be accepted literally, international arrangements could override all
those sections of the act which require a bilateral agreement for par-
ticular dealings with foreign countries.
The sections are obviously contradictory and a decision must be
made as to which shall prevail. An international arrangement adopted
by a majority of each branch of Congress would be tantamount to
amendatory legislation; a treaty likewise is supreme over prior legis-
lation. Thus, it seems apparent that an international arrangement can
bypass agreements for cooperation if it is so devised. In practice, it
is difficult to conceive of the United States entering into a multilateral
310. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, §§ 11(k), 124, 68 STAT. 923, 940, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2014(k), 2154 (Supp. III, 1955).
311. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 121, 68 STAT. 939, 42 U.S.C. § 2151 (Supp.
III, 1955).
312. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 122, 68 STAT. 940, 42 U.S.C. § 2152 (Supp.
III, 1955) ; see Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Amending the Atomic Energy Act
of 1946, as Amended, and for Other Purposes, H.R. Ri. No. 2181, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.
21 (1954).
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international arrangement and then confining its actual participation
to those parties who enter an agreement for cooperation in addition.
In fact, some countries advocating multilateral cooperation may well
balk at entering bilaterals.
All United States international activities thus far have involved
bilateral agreements. The bilateral scheme of international coopera-
tion differs quite markedly from the international program originally
suggested to the United Nations General Assembly on December 8,
1953.1' At that time, President Eisenhower had proposed a sort of
international atoms-for-peace bank, which would receive contributions
of nuclear material from member countries and then redistribute them
for use by other member countries. Congressional reaction to this idea
at the time was that the United States should not relinquish direct
control over its special nuclear material. The original idea is not dead,
however; in fact, a draft statute proposed to effect such a bank under
an International Atomic Energy Agency has recently been revised and
adopted by an eighty-two nation conference, with the anticipation that
such a body ultimately will materialize after ratification by the requisite
number of nations.3' 4
Such a multilateral arrangement will offer little or no technical
assistance from this country that is not now available via a bilateral.
The United States will be expected to contribute an appreciable amount
of nuclear material; apparently, some countries prefer to receive the
material from an intermediate international agency rather than from
donor nations. Such availability of material might deter other coun-
tries from constructing their own production facilities, thereby enabling
stronger supervision of their atomic progress. The existing allocations
of U-235 by this country for foreign use were originally destined for
bilateral purposes. However, the 5000 kilograms alloted to the initial
operations of the International Atomic Energy Agency plus the amounts
promised to match contributions of other nations also will be drawn
from such quantities made available by the President."
5
The Bilateral Program
As of the close of Congress in July 1956, agreements for coopera-
tion were in effect with thirty-six countries. The research bilaterals
follow in general the prototype agreement made with Turkey; they
313. Id. at 100-03, 133 (minority); The Reporter, Jan. 12, 1956, p. 11; Wit, Some
International Aspects of Atomic Power Development, 21 LAW & CONTMP. PROB. 148,
168-69 (1956).
314. AEC News Release, No. 894, Sept. 20, 1956.
315. AEC News Release, Nov. 18, 1956.
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are intended to provide the cooperating party with the means for
acquiring a research reactor.3 1  The Commission is to lease enriched
uranium (maximum U-235 content of twenty per cent) for a period
of five years (ten for Turkey), which shall not at any time be in
excess of six kilograms of contained U-235 (unless the Commission
later specifies otherwise). Recent announcement has been to the effect
that some research bilaterals may also be relaxed to allow provision to
each country of 100 grams of U-235, ten grams of plutonium and U-233,
all in highly enriched form.3 1 Originally, the form and content of this
material were not to be altered between the time of delivery and the
time of return to the Commission, meaning that all reprocessifig of
spent fuel, and plutonium recovery, would be done in the United States.
Apparently recognizing the gross impracticality of such a provision,
especially as applied to power reactors, the Commission now states that
it may allow reprocessing either in commission facilities or in facilities
designated by the Commission, the latter not necessarily being within
the United States.3 18 The United States agrees to permit persons
under its jurisdiction to provide information and services and to export
materials, including equipment and devices, to the cooperating nation
or authorized persons under its jurisdiction, but neither such informa-
tion, service nor materials can involve the communication of restricted
data. President Eisenhower promised that the United States would
pay fifty per cent of the cost of all research reactors acquired under
these bilaterals."' As of June 23, 1955, 200 kilograms of U-235 had
been allocated by the United States for distribution under these research
bilaterals.30
The initial reaction to the research bilateral approach was one of
skepticism on the part of some. A major need of most foreign countries
is power; research reactors used to train personnel and provide technical
information may eventually enable a country to be largely self-reliant in
its nuclear utilization. However, provision of power reactors in the
first instance, along with technicians to operate them, offers the power-
hungry country much more immediate benefit from investment of its
limited funds. This choice was undoubtedly considered thoroughly
316. Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Nationalist
China, Columbia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, France, West
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Lebanon, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand,
Turkey, United Kingdom, Uruguay, Venezuela. An agreement with Guatemala has been
signed. Negotiations are also being conducted with several other countries.
317. Address by Clark L. Vogel, AEC Division of International Affairs, Atomic
Industrial Forum Conference, Atlanta, April 18, 1956.
318. Atomic Industrial Forum Memo, June 1956, p. 24.
319. N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1955, p. 1, col. 8.
320. AEC News Release, June 24, 1955.
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before the research approach was adopted. Nevertheless, many coun-
tries have indicated a desire for nuclear power in the near future.3 '
If our industry is not allowed to supply the power reactor demand, it
is certain that other countries will soon be willing and able to do so,
although none is known to be doing so yet. 22  But modern power
reactors embody restricted data, thereby making it impossible for our
industry to offer these for foreign sale under existing research bilaterals.
This may deprive our industry of a much needed market for spreading
the development costs now being incurred. Furthermore, United
States industry may find it quite unprofitable to supply research
reactors; little criticism can be levelled if industry proves unable to
become a philanthropy or to devote its limited skilled personnel to an
unremunerative aspect of the atomic field.
By the beginning of 1956 no research reactors had been contracted
for, the only one to go abroad having been the demonstration swimming
pool reactor sold to Switzerland at the conclusion of the Geneva
conference. However, the early part of 1956 saw arrangements made
for the supplying of research reactors to seven countries by several
different American manufacturers. These reactors are going to
Brazil, Denmark, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain and West
Germany, and they range in heat capacity from fifty to 10,000 kilowatts.
The United States has promised to contribute $350,000 to the cost
of the reactor for Brazil, 3 representing the first such contribution
under the President's promise, and presumably will do likewise for
other countries.3 4 In anticipation of further cooperation, the United
States has allocated $2,800,000 to supply such aid to eight countries in
1956,13 and the Commission expects to make available additional
amounts of $5,950,000 for seventeen countries in 1957 and $4,200,000
for twelve more countries in fiscal year 1958.32
It still seems likely that many bilateral agreements will have to
be upgraded to include power reactors without an intervening purchase
of a research reactor. A group recently considering the problem has
recommended that negotiations for upgrading be initiated with each
bilateral country at the earliest opportunity.32 The 20,000 kilogram
321. McCune, Btsiness Opportunities in Atomic Energy, COMMERCIAL AND INTXR-
NATIONAL DxVELoPMENTS IN ATOMIC ENERGY 167 (Atomic Industrial Forum Report
No. 7, 1956) ; 13 NuCLEoNics 30 (1955).
322. Hearings, supra note 285, at 336; Life, June 4, 1956, p. 48.
323. AEC News Release, No. 814, April 20, 1956.
324. AEC News Release, No. 895, Sept. 2, 1956; AEC News Release, No. 831,
May 30, 1956.
325. Atomic Industrial Forum Memo, May 1956, p. 14.
326. Atomic Energy Clearing House, July 9, 1956, p. 2.
327. 1 PANEL ON THI ImPACT Op TH4 PErtcxuL Usss or ATOmIC ENERGY, op. cit.
supra note 308, at 8, 97.
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allocation of U-235 by this country for foreign use probably anticipates
such action. Some domestic companies reputedly have already ar-
ranged to construct power reactors in foreign countries if appropriate
bilaterals can be achieved. Financial assistance for foreign atomic
power plants can be obtained from the Export-Import Bank of Wash-
ington under its recent agreement with the Commission 2s As an
extreme measure, some contemplation has been made of constructing
power demonstration reactors in foreign countries at public expense
as part of our development program.
Seven existing bilaterals, with Canada, Belgium, the United King-
dom, the Netherlands, France, Switzerland and Australia, deviate from
the research pattern. They envisage the construction of power reactors
and some restricted data may be communicated. 29 The Commission
may provide requisite nuclear materials. Private persons are to be
permitted to provide information, services and materials, including
equipment and devices, to the cooperating nation or authorized persons
under its jurisdiction, within the limits set forth in the particular
bilateral. Belgium has already contracted with a United States com-
pany to construct a 11,500 kilowatt reactor, this being the only power
reactor yet exported under a bilateral." ° Authorization for some
United States industrial companies to engage in classified work under
the Canadian bilateral has been given recently."m The agreement
with the United Kingdom looks to fairly extensive exchange of in-
formation and materials; the agreements with the Netherlands, Switzer-
land and Australia permit export of up to 500 kilograms of U-235 in
twenty per cent enrichment form; France will receive only forty kilo-
grams of U-235 and no restricted data.
European Activities
The existing favorable foreign market for United States industry
may very well become more competitive within a few years. A recent
study by the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation dem-
onstrates that many countries are now thinking in terms of atomic
power with the intention of becoming self-sufficient as soon as pos-
sible.m2 This seventeen-nation program of cooperation postulates not
328. AEC News Release, No. 909, Oct. 16, 1956.
329. Wells, Program for Cooperation Under Bilateral Agreements With Other
Nations, COMMERCIAL AND INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS IN AToMIc ENERGY 224
(Atomic Industrial Forum No. 7, 1956).
330. Authorization by the AEC, April 2, 1956.
331. CCH ATomic ENERGY L. Ri. 6642 (April 6, 1956).
332. ORGANISATION VOR EuROPAN EcoNoMIc Co-oPERATIoN, PossIBImiuTIs oV
AcTIoN IN THz FIzLD or NucLAR ENERGY (1956); ORGANISATION iVOR EUROPEAN
EcONOMIC CO-orEATIoN, SoME AspEcTs op TnE EuRoPEAN ENERGY PROB*M 25-33, 47
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only construction of reactors, but also construction of isotope separation
plants, reprocessing and fabricating facilities and ore refining facilities.
The high costs of such a. program would be diffused by pooling the
efforts and resources of member countries. A relatively open market
for nuclear fuels is included as part of such a proposed program.
According to the study, member countries already possess six power
reactors and eight research reactors in operation or under construction,
and all of European manufacture.
Another proposed program of foreign cooperation is Euratom,
a proposal originated by M. Jean Monnet which would create a program
of atomic development by the six nations now comprising the European
Community for Coal and Steel. This proposal envisages a Euratom
Commission acting as owner and distributor of all noncommitted
nuclear fuels possessed in member countries. The Commission would
have powers of project approval and inspection, designed to assure only
peaceful application of these fuels. The Commission would be re-
sponsible for performing research and providing facilities for production
of enriched uranium and other necessary common services.
.Obstacles to International Development
A major problem that industry may encounter in the international
field is that persons with whom it may desire to do business are located
in countries which are not parties to any bilateral. In such a case, all
discussion or negotiation involving restricted data is forbidden, the
Commission being precluded from authorizing such activity. The
export of by-product or source material may be done under commission
authorization but no export of utilization or production facilities (aside
from component parts) or special nuclear material can take place until
a bilateral is effective. Thus, one of the parties must prod its govern-
ment to undertake the arrangement of such a bilateral. The United
States has indicated that it would respond to this outside impetus;
however, the foreign country may not. In fact, some countries are
probably abstaining from such bilaterals because of inability or lack
of desire to meet the conditions imposed. At this point it is important
to remember that the use of natural uranium is highly feasible for the
utilization of atomic power and such material is available to most
countries. Many countries had embarked upon programs of their
own prior to 1954, and some of these are electing to continue their
natural uranium programs so as to be independent of other countries.
In fact, such programs will ultimately provide the countries with their
own source of plutonium, for peaceful or military application as they
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may see fit. This desire for independence is most understandable and
it may be very unfortunate if American industry is deprived of a
substantial market and a chance to assist foreign development.
Even where bilaterals of adequate scope do exist, problems may
still be met. Strings tied to the supply of special nuclear material by
the Commission, e.g., inability or unwillingness to sell material out-
right or to provide for assurance of long term lease, may retard the
marketing abroad of any but natural uranium reactors, at least until
a foreign market develops for the supply of special nuclear material.
Yet, most of American industry's efforts so far have gone into develop-
ing reactors using enriched uranium fuel. The only way to be certain
that foreign users do not divert some special nuclear material to
military purposes would be to send them fabricated fuel elements and
require their return intact when spent; until very recently, the Com-
mission required such a procedure. Yet, it could not seriously be
contemplated that highly radioactive fuel elements from power reactors
in Turkey or Greece or Japan would be dispatched back to this country
for reprocessing. The increase in cost of foreign electrical power at-
tributed to such measures would be prohibitive in itself.33 As a
necessary consequence, the Commission now states that foreign re-
processing of fuel elements may be permitted in commission-designated
facilities. Many reactors use "blanket" material outside the reactor
core, in which special nuclear material is created during operation.
Since the blanket material will be owned by the foreign country, the
Commission would seem to have no voice in the reprocessing and
disposition of this material.
Supply of facilities may be complicated by a question already raised,
that is, whether the Commission should exert any control over the
character of the facility to be provided, especially as to its safety features.
Specification by the Commission of safety features not required by
the purchaser may place domestic industry at a marked price dis-
advantage with foreign industry which is free to supply whatever the
buyer wants. Another danger to industry operating abroad is the
infringement of foreign patents; e.g., the Fermi patents cover an in-
vention used in many reactors-in the United States this patent has
been acquired by the Government for public use but in some foreign
countries the patent is still outstanding in private hands.
Since foreign industry is not governed by the act, an interesting
question concerns the effect on United States shareholders of such in-
dustry when it engages in activities that are barred to the persons
333. See 2 PANEL ON TH4 IMPACT OP THZ PSACUPUL Uses Op AToMIC ENXRCY,
op. cil. supra note 308, at 326.
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themselves. Are such activities imputed to the shareholders? If not,
can our industry form foreign corporations and operate free of the act?
In this connection, it must be decided whether the statutory proscription
of unlicensed dealings in facilities " applies to persons within the
United States or to activities within the United States. Similarly,
can American industry own special nuclear material in foreign coun-
tries? " Can it own production facilities abroad, at least to the extent
that they do not involve restricted data? "'
A reasonable suggestion for simplifying the international picture
would be to allow unrestricted export of any nuclear material, facility or
information which is otherwise available on the international market
or which does not pose an unreasonable threat to the common defense
and security when in foreign hands. At present, this should include all
by-product material and source material and perhaps special nuclear
material in small concentrations of isotopic enrichment. Restrictions
might likewise be removed from the export of utilization or production
facilities which do not embody restricted data. Finally, the exchange of
restricted data, at least of the confidential category, should be made
possible with any country which is willing and able to protect it from
delivery into unfriendly hands. Since data of primary military im-
portance is top secret, beyond the reach of private industry per se
anyhow, this risk to security should not be appreciable even if some of
the information does gradually leak away. In this connection, it might
be remembered that the United States no longer is capable of controlling
nuclear developments abroad. Much of our information has already
been ferreted out by other countries through independent research;
a great deal more will be achieved as scientists continue to explore the
field. In all probability, foreign research will turn up important data
that we do not have and which we will want. Other countries are
going to have nuclear power and atomic weapons with or without
our help; it may be to our long run advantage to have it be the former
and to adjust our planning to an acceptance of these facts.
OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
In addition to the Atomic Energy Act, industry is also concerned
with legal complications in at least two other fields of federal law.
334. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 101, 68 STAT. 936, 42 U.S.C. § 2131 (Supp. III,
1955) ; see text at note 142 supra.
335. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 52, 68 STAr. 929, 42 U.S.C. § 2072 (Supp. III,
1955).
336. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, §§ 41(a), 57(a), 68 STAT. 928, 932, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2061(a), 2077(a) (Supp. III, 1955); see 21 FED. RIE. 418 (1956) (10 C.F.R. pt.
110).
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The novelty of atomic industry explains the relatively undeveloped law
in these areas. It would seem certain, however, that as industry
becomes more involved in atomic endeavors, the legal problems here
will be substantial.
Antitrust
One of these peripheral concerns is with the field of antitrust law.
The extreme financial losses which are currently involved in nuclear
power development, coupled with a prospect of continued loss until at
least 1965, have led many utilities to unite with each other and with
various suppliers, often by the formation of jointly-owned subsidiaries,
in building and operating prototype reactors. Private progress in
power reactors seems almost dependent upon the ability of industry
to thus share the expense. Such activities must be carefully designed to
avoid involving a combination in unreasonable restraint of trade under
the Sherman Act, an exclusive dealing or requirements contract ar-
rangement under the Clayton Act, or an unfair method of competition
under the Federal Trade Commission Act. The Atomic Energy Act
specifically states that nothing in it shall be deemed to excuse any person
from the effects of these antitrust laws.3
37
Holding Company Act of 1935
The other field of appreciable concern to industry concerns the
Holding Company Act of 1935." s Under this act, all holding com-
panies whose subsidiaries are engaged in the electric utility business
are subject to regulation-and control is presumed where the holding
company has at least ten per cent ownership of the subsidiary. Thus,
an operating utility, a reactor construction company or a fuel fabricator,
whenever it has an ownership interest in a corporation formed to con-
struct a nuclear reactor, risks being subjected to regulation as a
utility holding company. Several bills were introduced in Congress
for the announced purpose of easing the application of this law to
reactor building groups.3 9  The SEC now has modified rule U-7
under the Holding Company Act to provide that the definition of
"electrical utility companies" shall not apply to companies organized
on a non-profit basis to develop atomic power projectors where their
337. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, §§ 105, 158, 68 STAT. 938, 947, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2135, 2188 (Supp. III, 1955).
338. 49 STAT. 803, 15 U.S.C. § 79 (1952).
339. H.R. 9743, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956) (Rep. Sterling Cole) ; S. 2643, 84th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1955) (Senators Potter and Pastore); H.R. 6294, 84th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1955) (Rep. Dodd).
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only purpose is to produce heat or steam from special nuclear ma-
terials."' The need for any immediate legislative change may there-
fore have been alleviated.
341
CONCLUSION
Control and utilization of nuclear power began in the United
States under federal laws which effectively precluded industry from
participation for private purposes. .The Atomic Energy Act of 1954
represented a considerable relaxation and allowed private activities in
many areas wl'ich theretofore had been the exclusive domain of the
Government. In many respects, as might be expected, the act initially
provided industry with more opportunity for participation than could be
immediately utilized, with the consequence that there was little man-
ifested chafing against the boundaries of permitted activity. However,
as the scope of industry's endeavor in this new field has increased,
government control has become a subject of more critical opinion.
Primarily for protection of health and safety of the general public
and of persons engaged in this field, some continuing government regu-
lation will probably remain necessary and desirable. Nevertheless,
there is considerable private limitation in the act which does not pertain
to health and safety, an appreciable part of which may have outlived
its justification. Early modification or elimination of some sections
in the act seems warranted.
A matter of even more concern to industry is the possibility of
government re-entry into the nuclear power field. The calculated and
somewhat conservative progress of industry to date, coupled with its
current request for assistance from the Government in the form of
insurance, has been criticized at length by advocates of federal nuclear
power development. An entry by the Government into the large scale
production, sale and distribution phases of nuclear power is possible,
if not probable, and would certairily discourage further private ex-
penditures. Few industries will feel justified in investing private funds
in pioneer undertakings parallel to those of the Government. Any
federal program conceived by the forthcoming session of Congress
should be judiciously designed to protect the investment of those indus-
tries which have broken ground in the field with no expectation that
the sovereign ultimately would be their competitor.
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